Well of course the idea being unfalsifiable means it can be assumed without evidence to possess features that are consistent with the fundamental, mind-independent features of reality, that don’t violate the governing principles of the world, such as the laws of logic, physics. I was merely enquiring in that direction as I find the claim dubious.
So I guess I’d need the notion of “the Matrix” properly defined before I can accept your assertion that it is objectively possible.
Which ironically is the point I was making about your original claim, as it was not clear to me your claim was specifically talking about epistemic possibility. Though we have moved on from this now I think. As you agreed above, epistemically possible simply means we don’t know if it is possible or not, it defines the limit of our knowledge. It might be possible for all we know, but might also be impossible.
Only if one is claiming something is impossible, but not if one is stating they don’t know if something is impossible or not, which is epistemic possibility. Neither possible not impossible can be ruled out.
You keep making this assertion, it’s not clear why, as being dubious that something is possible need not mean one is certain it is impossible, or even have any knowledge that demonstrates it is impossible, I thought we had agreed that epistemically possible does not rule out it being impossible.
Excellent, then you agree that when you asserted something is possible until proven impossible, it means it might be either possible or impossible, and neither position can be ruled out.
I am dubious, this seems inaccurate to me. The notion of a “default possibility” most closely resembles epistemic possibility, but it is not the same thing. The phrase “possible by default” can be interpreted in a few ways, but none is identical to epistemic possibility. Epistemic possibility relates to a body of knowledge, which can change over time or between individuals. In contrast, a “default” can refer to a principle or rule that may not be tied to knowledge.
I imagine this is why we have distinct phrases to describe the different concepts of possibility, and why not being clear can cause confusion.
So at the start when I said I don’t know of any objective evidence that (a deity for example), and now a separate reality that is hidden by an imaginary one we perceive as real, I was not claiming they are impossible, so epistemic possibility is irrelevant. I can’t speak to their objective possibility until someone defines those ideas accurately.
I could say for example a wapadook is possible as we have no knowledge it is impossible, but without more my statement is misleading. However it is moot now, and we have I hope moved on, as I accepted you meant epistemically possible, and you accepted this still means something might be impossible, we just don’t know.
I think calling it a matrix-style simulation is sufficient - in a general sense, a simulated world that has begun “in motion” (i.e., the simulation did not begin from the beginning of human history - it has edited memories to give the impression of a past that didn’t actually happen - at least for the individuals in the simulation), it is capable of error-correcting to preserve the illusion (editing memories, changing parameters of the simulation, etc.), and that humans are in a simulation, but potentially also simulated beings without a human mind behind them.
A simulation in the most general sense is always going to be possible because we would never be able to rule it out without knowing what laws may exist outside the simulation. Without knowledge of anything that would render it impossible, we couldn’t render it impossible.
But the claim can go even further - even if some future development somehow “proved beyond all doubt” that we were not in a simulation - some hitherto unknown knowledge that can’t even be conceived now - it still wouldn’t be proof, because such “proof” could be the simulation giving the illusion of proof. So we can therefore say with certainty, on this basis, there could never be any proof against the idea of a simulation - it is unfalsifiable, and no future knowledge, even knowledge not conceived now, could override that.
yes, that is fine. That has been my position from the outset - just because something is said to be possible, it only means it hasn’t been determined to be impossible with current knowledge.
You were making the argument that possibility hasn’t been established as certainty, and I was pointing out it doesn’t need to be because it’s a position of uncertainty.
Talking about being dubious that something is possible is like being dubious that something is uncertain or unknown.
It’s like someone saying “We don’t know if unicorns could exist somewhere in the universe”, it’s fine to be dubious about them existing, but being dubious about it not being known doesn’t make sense. One would need evidence to support being dubious about an uncertainty because the alternative is some degree of certainty. “Possible” is a position of uncertainty, so being dubious would be diverging toward certainty either in a positive or negative direction.
Yes, I did state that at the outset. I pointed out that saying something is possible means that it hasn’t been determined impossible based on current knowledge.
It’s the same as saying something is uncertain or unknown by default. The resting position is “0”, any divergence toward -1 or 1 is a divergence toward certainty, based on available knowledge.
Yes, I recall giving the example that a zyxxy is possible, and that it would need knowledge to change that position - possibility - as a position of uncertainty - reflects a lack of knowledge.
I agree though - we can move on now as it seems we have essentially reached an agreement.
To assert it is objectively possible seems dubious to me, unless one can acknowledge such a world could exist, on what basis would we assert that?
Fine for epistemic possibility, but not for objective possibility, this requires more than an absence of knowledge.
It seems a little circular, the claim being used to justify the claim even after the claim is falsified.
Well, we can say in it’s current guise it is unfalsifiable, but this offers epistemic possibility, not objective possibility.
How compelling should we find any argument that predicts what future knowledge we might uncover, and again this only justifies epistemic possibility, not objective.
Was I, doesn’t sound like me, as certainty is a word I am generally careful to avoid, or at least use very carefully. If we are talking about epistemic possibility then we simply cannot know, objective possibility would require more than just an absence of knowledge that something was impossible.
I don’t see that sorry, we are talking about what is ostensibly an unfalsifiable idea, thus agnosticism is a given for me, I would doubt any unfalsifiable claim and its negation, I have been pretty clear on that point, certainty does not enter that rationale.
Lost me sorry. The claim “We don’t know if unicorns could exist somewhere in the universe”, isn’t unfalsifiable, we can examine collective knowledge to test it. If no such knowledge exists then it is correct, if it does exist the assertion would be incorrect.
Paradoxically the claim “unicorns exist somewhere in the universe,” is unfalsifiable, at least until we have the means to test it by examining the entire universe for unicorns. Now I’d be dubious about this claim, but not about the claim "we don’t know if unicorns could exist somewhere in the universe”.
Agreed, it would not make sense to doubt this claim in the absence of evidence that such knowledge existed, but this claim is not unfalsifiable, we could test the collective of human knowledge and it would be either true that we lack such knowledge or untrue.
Epistemic possibility yes, I never said I was dubious that an unfalsifiable hidden reality might be possible, or impossible, or epistemically possible, only that I was dubious it was objectively possible, as this requires more than a mere absence of knowledge that something is impossible.
I wasn’t asserting that I was dubious a matrix type world was an unknown possibility, or epistemically possible, only that possibility is the default position is not the same as something being epistemically possible.
The default position in most people’s minds is that dragons are imaginary creatures. We operate under this assumption because we have no evidence to the contrary, even though we can concede that their existence is an epistemic possibility (for all we know, in some hypothetical, as-yet-undiscovered part of the world, there could be a dragon).
Good, but this possibility is describing an epistemological limit, not a default position per se. If we can’t or don’t know whether something is possible or not, then we can default to neither possibility or its negation, we can rule neither out, and the best we can do is keep an open mind.
Epistemic possibility = something is possible if it isn’t ruled out by one’s own knowledge or justified belief
Objective possibility = something is possible if it isn’t ruled out by the general corpus of knowledge
Nomological possibility = something is possible if it can be objectively evidenced as occurring/being under the general corpus of knowledge
The need to assert such a world could exist is a requirement for nomological possibility.
The only difference between epistemic possibility and objective possibility is the source of the knowledge that would otherwise rule out something as impossible - for epistemic possibility, it’s one’s own knowledge and justified beliefs; for objective possibility, it’s the corpus of knowledge that one has to reasonably examine for anything ruling it out.
No, just a wider scale for knowledge - objective (corpus of) knowledge as opposed to subjective. As above.
It’s just an application of logic.
Consider proof exists that definitively counters the possibility of a simulation
Consider that a simulation could include a scenario in which (1) is accepted without question (i.e., (1) is forcibly accepted as correct)
As (1) can exist within a simulation, (1) therefore cannot disprove a simulation
As per the above logic, it cannot be objectively ruled out, therefore it is objectively possible.
Even without knowing future knowledge, we know the above logic steps are complete. No knowledge can break out of the steps because that still comes under (1) which is subject to (2), and therefore cannot disprove (2) as per (3).
I was paraphrasing your argument. When you say: “would require more than just an absence of knowledge” - you are essentially saying there needs to be a degree/measure of certainty (as opposed to uncertainty)
absence of knowledge = uncertainty
knowledge = a measure of certainty
i.e., we need to have knowledge of something to make it closer to certain and less uncertain.
This is nomological possibility however as explained above.
I’m not disputing or challenging your doubt or agnosticism on any claim itself. Just the possibility of a claim. If something is (objectively) unfalsifiable, it’s epistemically/objectively possible, but that doesn’t give it any weight in terms of whether it should be believed or disbelieved as a claim. So agnosticism/disbelief is fine.
being dubious on something being possible simply because it hasn’t been ruled out by the corpus of knowledge isn’t supportable by logic though - that’s not to say you can’t hold a belief in it not being possible, and I have no issue with people having beliefs, but that is all it would be. From a logical standpoint, it is uncertain/unknown/possible.
The point here was that if someone said it is possible that unicorns exist in the universe, it would align with “we don’t know if unicorns exist somewhere in the universe”, but doesn’t mean “unicorns exist somewhere in the universe” - the claim that it is possible is an argument of uncertainty - we don’t otherwise know.
In the same way, with the simulation possibility, we don’t know if the world is a simulation - it is a possibility, but we cannot justifiably claim that the world actually is without further evidence.
As above, that would be nomological possibility.
these are not incompatible positions:
Dragons are referenced in myth/legend in various forms. They feature in fictional media.
People consider dragons (pertaining to their reference as myth/legend/fiction) as imaginary. The idea that dragons once existed in historical/ancient historical times is not supported by known evidence, so a view that such entities are imaginary is justifiably reasonable.
Dragons cannot be ruled out as impossible, either epistemically or objectively, so they are epistemically and objectively possible by default. Whether they are nomologically possible may depend on a more specific definition of what a dragon is.
As you say, we can concede that their existence is an epistemic possibility as they could exist somewhere as yet undiscovered - which supports them being (epistemically and/or objectively) possible by default because nothing has ruled them out as impossible otherwise.
yes, saying something is possible by default is keeping an open mind - it is an epistemically open position - a recognition that it can still be ruled out as impossible if new knowledge becomes available. To say it is possible by default is not intending to close or conclude the position. It is tantamount to saying “we don’t know otherwise.” - i.e., it has not yet been ruled out.
That seems like epistemic possibility? The objective possibility of something is a property of that thing or world itself, not dependent on whether we, as observers, are aware of it or can prove it, what is objectively possible does not change based on what any person or group believes or knows. It is determined by the fundamental properties and laws of the world.
The two concepts differ in their subject matter, scope, and truth conditions, not just in the origin of knowledge.
We still can’t assert something is objectively possible based solely on an absence of knowledge. Even if it represents the totality of human knowledge. As a justified claim about objective possibility relates to how the world actually could be, it requires evidence to support it. A claim about epistemic possibility, however, is based on ignorance. If you lack evidence about something, you can say it is epistemically possible, but you cannot justifiably claim it is objectively possible.
1 can only be true if 3 is false, to assert both are true at the same time and in the same place violates the law of non-contradiction.
The fact we can’t falsify or disprove something being possible, does not mean it is objectively possible, only epistemically possible.
Then you paraphrased me incorrectly, I rarely use the word certainty, and am always careful to try and avoid absolutes, which is why I try and avoid that word. Besides if something is epistemically possible, we needn’t worry about certainty, as we simply don’t know, our knowledge either way is at zero.
That’s it for now, work beckons…
Asserting something is possible is a claim.
I never claimed that, you said it was objectively possible, which requires more than solely a lack of knowledge, hence my diubt, and diubt is as far removed from certainty as I can imagine.
You made a claim.
Your claim was that a “matrix” type hidden reality was objecticely possible.
I am dubious about that claim.
Not about epistemic possibility, as it’s a given we don’t know whether an unfalsifiable idea is possible.
Not really, it would be epistemically possible, which is to say we don’t know whether it’s possible.
The claim it might be possible is one of uncertainty, as is the claim I doubt it is possible, as is the claim it might be impossible.
It is epistemically possible, so we don’t know it is a possibility, only that it might be.
No, nomologically and objectively are not mutually exclusive, but nor are they the same. The absence of knowledge along, allows epistemic possibility, but not objective possibility as you claimed.
Life on Mars is both epistemically and objectively possible, pink unicorns on Mars are epistemically possible, but not objectively possible.
An open mind simply means trwating ideaswithout bias for or against. If tge possibility is an unknown, as in epistemic, then defaulting to possible, or impossible must involve bias to some degree. I would doubt both positions until or unless some evidence justified favouring either.
Weasel words are words or statements that are intentionally ambiguous or misleading. The quote you took is intentionally specific and providing clarity - it’s clearing up ambiguity.
Epistemic possibility is based on one’s own knowledge and/or justified beliefs
Objective possibility is based on the corpus of knowledge.
This is supported by the same article I linked, as per:
“the truth of an objective possibility claim is independent of humans’ epistemic situation.”
So epistemic possibility = human’s epistemic situation; objective possibility = the objective situation. Given a fair number of your responses are relating to this point, I will consider my answer here to answer each of the subsequent repetitions of the same point where this answer covers them (to reduce further repetition)
It is specifically nomological possibility that requires evidence to support the claim that something is nomologically possible.
1 isn’t a truth claim - it says to consider. 3 is stating that the outcome of the consideration of (1) can exist inside a simulation, therefore, the consideration (1) cannot work - (1) cannot be a truth claim (Which is the point being made in step 3)
It’s like saying:
Consider an apple is a type of orange
Oranges are segmented
As an apple is not segmented, it cannot be an orange, therefore as (1) violates (2), (1) cannot be true.
I wasn’t claiming you were stating an absolute - as my clarification about the paraphrasing stated, “a degree/measure of certainty” - certainty isn’t a binary/absolute - it’s a sliding scale. Any step away from 0 (uncertainty) is a step toward certainty by some measure.
There’s the claim (something is possible) and there is the claim (something) - so yes, calling something possible is a claim in its own right, but that’s distinct from the claim of “something”
X possibly equals Y is a claim. It is a valid claim. It is contingent on the values of X and Y as to whether it is the case or not. “X equals Y” is a claim.
My point is that I am not challenging your doubt or agnosticism of a claim like “X equals Y”, but doubt or agnosticism of a claim that X possibly equals Y wouldn’t be supportable by logic.
I would go as far as to say that it is even nomologically possible, depending on how one defines unicorns.
We know that horses can exist. We know that animals can develop horns. A unicorn is a horse-like creature with a single horn on its head. It is therefore evidenced that a unicorn could be possible based on evidence supporting the possibility. We know that one world in the universe has life. It is therefore possible that other worlds have life. It is therefore possible that a unicorn could exist somewhere else in the universe.
That’s literally what possibility means (in this context) something that “might be”. It is not stating anything more than “something might be” and consequently, “might not be”
Accepting something as possible is not biased. It doesn’t grant any favour to the thing being considered possible. It’s still an unknown, an uncertainty. Something that has not yet been ruled out, but could be with further knowledge/evidence.
Again, doubting something is different from doubting the possibility of something. I am not challenging or disputing a position of doubt toward something being factual unless some evidence justified favouring either.
Something being possible is not favouring it over being impossible. It may be possible, it may be impossible - that status does not change. It’s still at position “0” - it could go either way. Saying it is possible is acknowledging it is at “0” and that it hasn’t shifted in either direction. It is not a position of evidence, but it can be strengthened with evidence, especially if the thing is falsifiable.
That doesnt support your claim? Since you asserted…
No not solely, read my objection above.
Yes, but not solely, objective possibility cannot be asserted based solely on an absence of knowledge, tgat is epistemic possibility.
I never claimed it was true.
Which can’t be true if 1 is true.
I never used the word, you introduced it to paraphrase my post, if my meaning is unclear just ask for clarification.
I know?
I never claimed to doubt that, only your claim that something was objectively possible. My reasons are above.
Then the word loses any meaning, a unicorn ia banana, bananas exist, ipso facto unicorns are possible, and not just might be possible. Semantics…
Yes.
Nope, false equivalence, come on…don’t pretend you haven’t gone from objectively evidenced to imaginary.
I’m trying very hard to be polite. Only horses and horns being possible is evidenced…come on…
Indeed, objectively possible and nomologically possible.
False equivalence, it is epistemically possible, but itbis not objectively or nomologically possible.
No, since you very specifically said objectively possible, that is not the context.
Indeed, are you aserting that there is no difference between epistemic possibility and objective possibility?
Nor did I suggest it was, there are difderent types of possibility, and a claim might be biased if it is made for a particular type when it is not justified.
We are talking specifically about the possibility of an unfalsifiable idea, and you claiming it was objectively possible, I would doubt that claim, and similarly would doubt a claim it was impossible.
“To say that some proposition p is epistemically possible, is roughly to say that we cannot, given what we know, rule out that p is true”
you seem to have drifted off on the point you were trying to make here - not sure how I can answer it without knowing why specifically you are claiming it doesn’t support my claim.
Again, the point isn’t explained
You said:
I presumed you were making this point for a reason, hence my clarification of what was said surrounding this point.
That was the point of step 3 - it was indicating that the consideration (1) could not be true. The conclusion being that there could be no proof against a simulation, either now or in the future (hence it being unfalsifiable)
I didn’t say you did use the word. I was just validating my paraphrasing. Your meaning wasn’t unclear.
possible still means might be possible. It’s still not a truth claim. In this case, nomological possibility also takes it a step further in terms of evidencing the possibility, but it’s still a might be possible - it just means a higher bar for it to be called possible.
I highlighted from the outset:
What we consider a unicorn now is a mythological creature, however if one considers the basic common definition of a unicorn, it is a horse-like creature with a horn on its head.
Consider if humans managed to travel to a life-bearing world and saw a horse-like creature with a horn on its head, it would reasonably be considered a unicorn. That is not to say that the mythical creature first called a unicorn was actually a real being from this particular planet (though logically there could still be the possibility if technologically advanced alien life transported such a creature to Earth in the past, which gave rise to the myth), but either way, a creature meeting the physical description of a unicorn would be sufficient - depending on how one defines a unicorn, as I stated at the outset.
your subsequent objections also tie in to this same response
Something being possible means it might be possible. Whether it is epistemic, objective or nomologically possible, it’s still a “might be” because it is possible but may or may not be true (being possible as stated before, does not make a truth-value claim)
I have already explained the differences. Both however are still “might be”.
You seem to have ignored my objection about your claim that a matrix type illusion is objectively possible, and are explaining what epistemically possible means, even though we both accept it is unfalsifiable?
I never claimed you had asserted it was true, only that your reasoning involves a circular argument.
Exactly why i said the reasoning was circular, since you used an unevidenced claim about the thing you were arguing for, so begging the question, this is typically a flaw in circular arguments.
You were, for want of a better phrase “loading the dice”.
" Circular reasoning is not a formal logical fallacy, but a pragmatic defect in an argument whereby the premises are just as much in need of proof or evidence as the conclusion. As a consequence, the argument becomes a matter of faith and fails to persuade those who do not already accept it."
1, I never claimed you said id used it.
2. I very specifically explained I try to steer clear of using it.
3. If you can’t understand what vie posted then by all means ask for clarification, please don’t put words in my mouth by inaccurately paraphrasing my position.
Doubt and disbelief are not certainty, that is axiomatic.
It axiomatically doesn’t just mean that, since we have been examining different meanings it has.
Your claim was untrue?
[quote=“fireflies, post:152, topic:6637”]
[quote=“Sheldon, post:150, topic:6637”]
This is inaccurate, a unicorn is an imaginary creature, that is assigned those attributes. They are not objectively possible, though if one wanted to one could assert they are epistemically possible, this epistemic distinction is lost if one assert unicorns are possible, to be true.
Then it isn’t such a creature, only imagined to be, see how that is distinct from the assertion an elephant has 4 legs and a trunk…one is real and therefore possible, the other can only be asserted as epistemically possible. Along with just about anything we imagine really, garden fairies, mermaids, dragons, Santa Claus, deities, etc etc.
Yes of course, but that’s a false equivalence, as it would have ceased to be purely imaginary. The attributes of things that exist can be claimed to be nomologically necessary, this is not true of the characteristics we assign unicorns.
It can mean that yes, it can also mean other things, it is not a single absolute assertion, as you have amply demonstrated. Epistemically possible, and objectively possible are not the same.
Claiming that x is possible, is a claim it is true that x is possible. Lets not delve in pointless semantics, I love semantic arguments as much as anyone, but surely we can agree that when you claims a matrix type world is objectively possible, you believed the claim to be true.
Or are you saying your claim that a matrix type illusion was objectively possible, was untrue, or that you don’t know?
Indeed, yet they are different claims. This is now looking like a false equivalence.
A piece of fruit “might be” an apple, with no more information this represents epistemic possibility, however it is also objectively possible, and nomologically possible, claims can overlap, they are not however the same.
This is why weeks ago, I asserted that possibility has to be demonstrated. Epistemic possibility has the lowest standard and puts the onus on demonstrating knowledge that something is impossible, objective possibility cannot be asserted based solely on an absence of knowledge, even the totality of human knowledge.
Bias as well, it’s astonishing how people can acquire a good education, and yet evade the habit of thinking critically. Well, I mean it’s astonishing to an uneducated middling intellect like mine anyway.
The biggest problem with philosophy I have uncovered so far, in all my years at university, in my working career, and by talking directly with philosophers – and indirectly about them and the field with people who also have encountered them – is that they much too often tend to put too much of an exaggerated emphasis on using a lot of words when they explain stuff. And by a lot of words, i mean REALLY a lot of words; so much so that in philosophy they – as compared to other fields I have encountered – by far excel in using superfluous and redundant pleonasmic verbiage, with very high verbose verbosity, without really explaining much (as an example from a philosophy textbook on scientific methodology from a philosophy perspective I once had to read, there was pages and pages with examples of increasing complexity, where the last and most complex one alone would have illustrated the whole thing much better alone than in companion with all the other, lesser, examples – a good example of the sum being less than its individual components). Perhaps the only ones that in my experience can match philosophers in verbosity are crackpots doing crackpottery.
I didn’t ignore it, you didn’t explain it, as per below.
That’s the point, I didn’t clip anything. You literally just said:
you tailed off with the three dots, that’s not me clipping.
It wasn’t, as above.
you didn’t mention circular argument, you said if both were true at the same time they would violate the law of non-contradiction. I said it wasn’t intended for both to be true, (3) was showing that (1) couldn’t be true.
It was a logic claim. The evidence was the logic provided in the steps.
The problem is - and this is where you have made an error - is that there is a circular argument here… but my steps were pointing out the circular argument, not making a circular argument.
The circular argument is:
Consider proof exists that definitively counters the possibility of a simulation
For this proof to be valid, it would necessarily need to exist outside a simulation, to avoid the proof being a fabrication of the simulation
Now you have a circular argument. The proof depends on the thing it sets out to definitively counter not existing for it to be valid proof that the thing doesn’t exist
That’s the circular argument, and that is what my logical steps point out doesn’t work.
Let’s revisit your quote for “circular reasoning”:
The first premise, step 1:
Consider proof exists that definitively counters the possibility of a simulation
This is a hypothetical assumption. Logic allows an internally consistent hypothetical without needing to prove it. This step is internally consistent - it hypothesises a possible future discovery that would disprove the possibility that reality as we know it is actually a simulation.
Therefore it doesn’t need proof or evidence as required for circular reasoning to apply on this step.
So, onto the next premise, step 2:
Consider that a simulation could include a scenario in which (1) is accepted without question (i.e., (1) is forcibly accepted as correct)
This is a logical possibility (objective possibility - metaphysical) - it is logically coherent, it is not self-contradictory.
We can logically consider the possibility of a simulation that includes acceptance of what the participants of that simulation consider to be proof that a simulated reality is not possible (i.e., step 1)
The distinguishing point here is that the proof from step 1 isn’t actually valid in this possible simulation, it is only accepted as such because the simulation is “programmed” in such a way.
Consider the following:
We need oxygen to breathe
It has been definitively proven that we need oxygen to breathe
Consider the hypothetical situation that reality as we know it only began a second ago, and that all prior experience, memories, etc. are a product of a simulation, and we are in a simulated world
The knowledge in steps (1) and (2) are a product of that simulation. It is logically possible that outside the simulation, the very concept of breathing is a ridiculous idea, “imagine needing to have an abundant source of a particular chemical element constantly surrounding you in order to stay alive!”
Yet in such a hypothetical simulation, a person would reasonably not question the fact they need to breathe. Their existing knowledge would be accepted as fact. Even if a person was a scientist, they wouldn’t reasonably feel the need to double check that the knowledge they already have is actually correct and not a “false memory” created by a simulation.
So, once again, there is no need for proof or evidence to further support step 2.
Finally we move onto the conclusion, step 3:
As (1) can exist within a simulation, (1) therefore cannot disprove a simulation
This conclusion is supported by the possibility of (1) existing in a simulation. If we didn’t accept this as a given, it would be a circular argument.
i.e., if (1) can’t exist within a simulation, you have a circular argument. You would need to restrict possible simulations to not be able to include (1) - this would be “loading the dice” to borrow your phrase.
I didn’t put words in your mouth. If you have an issue with the paraphrased response I gave and the explanations I have given for that paraphrasing, by all means, address that directly. Otherwise, we just have a back and forth that isn’t addressing the actual point you’re disagreeing with. If you think I didn’t understand what you said then please clarify how what I followed up with (and further explained to clarify) doesn’t equate to what you had said originally. I think we’re so far removed from the original point now we’d both have to scroll up to see what the actual argument was.
It seems to me that you’re taking exception to the use of a word. It was a word I used, not a word you used, and I explained why I used the word, and how I related it back to what you had said. If you have a problem with it misrepresenting what you said, then make that argument instead.
Yes, and for each meaning, it’s still only "might be possible. Consider the different meanings we have discussed:
Epistemic possibility - based on one’s knowledge or justified beliefs, something might be possible
Objective possibility - based on the corpus of knowledge, something might be possible
Metaphysical possibility (a form of objective possibility) - based on logic, “something” is not self-contradictory and therefore might be possible
Nomological possibility (another form of objective possibility) - based on the corpus of knowledge of what is physically possible (i.e., science) and what can be supported as possible based on that knowledge, something might be possible
In each case, the “possible” is still nothing more than might be. Consider the examples:
Epistemic possibility: Xyzzy possibly exists
Objective (Metaphysical) possibility: Time possibly exists as a fourth dimension, and all moments in time possibly exist already as part of that fourth dimension.
Objective (Nomological) possibility: Life possibly exists on one or more planets elsewhere in the universe
False dichotomy.
By saying “not a truth claim”, this is saying that it’s not making any claim as to whether or not something is true. In this context, it is only saying that something is possible (might be true, might not be true) - it has not shifted in either direction in terms of probability, truth, etc.
That’s begging the question. A unicorn is not necessarily imaginary. We consider it imaginary after the fact because it is not known to exist in the world, but when the concept of a unicorn was established, it was not established as being a necessarily imaginary being.
If a person imagines an elephant, not having seen an elephant before, and through their imagination, they correctly define it as a large, heavy creature, grey in colour, with a long trunk for a nose, big ears, four legs like tree stumps, and ivory tusks. What they have imagined is actually something that exists. Just because they imagine it doesn’t prevent it from being an elephant because the thing they imagined has to be imaginary.
Your subsequent responses on this point are answered by this response, so again, I won’t repeat my response to each repeated point.
Again, I am distinguishing between a claim being made (something is possible) is a truth, and the thing being said to be possible having a truth value (i.e., because x is possible, x is more true than y, which has not been declared possible) - saying x is possible doesn’t assign any truth value to make it higher than y.
Nomological possibility cannot be asserted based solely on the absence of knowledge, even the totality of human knowledge - it requires supporting evidence from what is known.
Objective possibility can merely be logically possible (metaphysical possibility) and as long as it is logically coherent (not self-contradictory) then it is assertable in the absence of knowledge, and does not need to be supported beyond being logically coherent.
If you are saying you believe it to be “BS” then I am not going to stand in the way of your belief.
If you are making a claim that it is “BS” (i.e., an assertion of something being fact), then I would say you have the burden of proof.
I have met the burden from my end. I have provided a peer-reviewed academic source supporting my position, so if it is being claimed by you to be factually incorrect, you would need to provide an equivalent standard of evidence or better to rebut that point.
yes a peer reviewed philosophy of science article, which means its worthless. might as well be peer reviewed parapsychologist paper or outer space puppy grooming.
Read the first two sentences: Scientists regularly make possibility claims. While philosophers of science are well aware of the distinction between epistemic and objective notions of possibility, we believe that they often fail to apply this distinction in their analyses of scientific practices that employ modal concepts.
science isn’t about making possibility claims, this is fundamentally misguided from the first sentence. its trash because the whole field is trash