It may be best to avoid the question of (im)possibility altogether and focus on probabilities, which is my reasoning with regard to how I debate theists on the existence of God. More often than not, it avoids a theist “possibility trap” wherein you “admit” that it’s possible their god exists so that they can claim a “win” without addressing the probability that it exists or how seriously their claims in the matter should be taken. Or as I usually put it, you are accused of making a positive claim of god’s non-existence (= impossible) when that is not what the vast majority of atheists do; it’s a question of (the absence of) belief, and the lack of evidence for same.
Particularly due to the current tendency here in 'Murica for people to have private definitions for what’s true that have no correspondence to physical reality, even sticking to probabilities is fraught enough.
It was entirely relevant to my claim as I simply said a matrix-style world was a bit of a stretch but it was a valid idea.
I then clarified that I meant the idea was possible.
The link I provided has supported the position that claiming something is possible by default is a valid position.
You don’t get to arbitrarily dismiss supporting evidence - the relevance is blatant - a link that addresses types of possibility, when your claim was that my claim about possibility was argumentum ad ignorantiam. The link proves your rebuttal false.
The link I’ve provided and quoted from proves otherwise. Bare assertion fallacies that it does not are just attempts at proof by assertion. I provided my support. empty dismissals have no value.
Not a lie. I have explained from the first why that was incorrect, and you’re continuing to push this despite evidence to the contrary as provided, which by definition is a proof by assertion fallacy:
“Proof by assertion, sometimes informally referred to as proof by repeated assertion, is an informal fallacy in which a proposition is repeatedly restated regardless of contradiction and refutation.”
Right here as re-quoted - you ignored it for so long (4 days now) despite my repeated references to it, it’s no wonder you couldn’t find it:
Valid how? It seems like an unfalsifiable idea to me, as does the generic claim for an extant deity of course. However I’m happy to listen to rational arguments or objecyive evidence, as I am for any claim.
Yeah I genuinely missed this link, and possibility has to be demonstrated, just like any other claim, otherwise belief is simply wishful thinking borne of bias.
Straw man…
I saw no link, but I did see your use of an argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy, a textbook example.
I am dubious, but please quote where it does this, and offer the link again, as i must have missed it.
Still a lie, i offerred your claim and a verbatim explanation of the fallacy.
Still a lie.
Yes it was.
You first made the farcical claim that your origianl assertion had no truth value, then asserted (when pressed) it was epistemologically true.
To assert something is true, because it has been proved untrue is fallacious.
Indeed, but ive not just used repetition, so your sophistry is again self evident.
Do you accept that the notion reality is an illusion, is unfalsifiable, if not then why not?
I worked 93 hours last week, it’s not much above my average gor the last tgree months, just quote the salient part, and offer the link.
Ah I see you’ve linked a downloadable file, but I’m not doing your research for you, please quote where that link is relevant to your argumentum ad ignorantiam falkacy, where you asserted that something not proved impossible, must be possible.
I wasn’t intending it to be an argument at all. I was just making a passing comment two weeks ago:
I do agree that claiming a “win” on something being possible would be entirely pointless. It would just be one of infinite possible things. I find the possibility of the world being a simulation a useful thought experiment - it contextualises scepticism and epistemological humility - how little we can really know. I wasn’t trying to argue that people should become hackers and follow white rabbit tattooed people, I just acknowledged it was a valid idea - the whole argument that has sprung up from that simple sentence has unfortunately deflected from any meaningful discussion on the question of reality, but c’est la vie.
Well it’s usefullnes IMHO, is in recognising episteological limits, and where they don’t justify claims or investing belief in them.
Again for clarity, if we can"t or don’t know whether something is possible or not, then we can’t assert either way, and to assert that (it is true that) something is possible, because it hasn’t been proved impossible is demonstrably an argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy.
Like any and all claims, possibility carries a burden of proof, as does its negation.
Which is supported by the article linked and quoted on September 12th (4 days ago):
So now that you have literally brought the argument full circle back to the first thing you asked about my saying something was a valid idea, we can surmise the following:
The idea of the matrix is a valid idea
By valid, I mean it is possible, and by possible, I mean it hasn’t been ruled out by what is known
The fact that the idea is unfalsifiable as per your own admission only serves to prove it must be possible. Something can’t be unfalsifiable and not possible by definition, these are mutually exclusive.
You can however, as per the link I provided, declare that the nomological possibility is unknown and that an argument for an unfalsifiable idea being nomologically possible would be an argumentum ad ignorantiam because its unfalsifiability means it can’t be determined possible in accordance with the nomological possibility requirements.
As nomological possibility is not the standard, and even when one talks of possibility in scientific scholarly articles (as the link points out), it’s not necessarily nomological possibility they are meaning, your arguments of argumentum ad ignorantiam are incorrect - misapplied to what is considered an argument pertaining to epistemic possibility.
possibility doesn’t have to be demonstrated, no. Not unless it’s nomological possibility. Objective possibility would expect belief to be justified (i.e., checking against a corpus of knowledge for anything that might rule it out) but epistemic possibility is simply based on one’s own knowledge.
Neither objective possibility or epistemic possibility needs to be proved - in this case, the absence of evidence is sufficient - either the absence of any contradictory constraints in the corpus of knowledge for objective possibility, or in one’s own knowledge for epistemic possibility.
By your own admission, you didn’t even see the link, so you haven’t read it, so dismissing it as irrelevant is arbitrary.
Literally as above, and no, it isn’t a textbook example. Saying something is possible is not assigning a truth value to the claim. You’re trying to twist it to mean that the claim is that something is possible, and that is evidenced by it not contravening epistemically known constraints. You talk of text books but you haven’t offered any external evidence to support your claim.
Already? Sure.
and the quote from the link:
your verbatim explanation of the fallacy is irrelevant. I pointed out why the fallacy didn’t apply, and I quoted the link which supported this point. You have continued arguing the point despite this, which makes it proof by assertion.
I understand you missed the link, and I have relinked it again, twice now - but bear in mind this is 4 days after I posted the link and every comment I made since has referred to there being a link - you kept ignoring it for four days until you have now said you didn’t see it.
Oh? What value do empty dismissals have then? Or are you saying it’s a lie that I provided my support?
I am interested to see how you can defend either of these points being a lie. I demonstrably provided my support as shown by the link I have re-quoted twice already. The claim that empty dismissals have no value is self-evident - they’re empty.
Are we seriously reducing the argument to “was not” “was too” playground tactics? My “Not a lie.” was followed with a response detailing why it was not. If you choose to separate this to throw back a “yes it was”, I seriously have to wonder what your motive is here.
No, the farce here is that we literally spent over four days arguing over the point that I was not making a truth-value claim, and that a claim of something being possible is an epistemically true claim.
Let’s count the fallacies:
Strawman: You’re misrepresenting my argument here. I have repeatedly distinguished truth-value (stating a matrix-world style reality is possible doesn’t assign truth value to the idea) from a statement being epistemically true (saying X is possible is a claim, a claim by definition is a claim that something is epistemically true) - so there are two distinct “truths” at play:
a) X is possible doesn’t mean X is true in any measure. If X begins at 0 (neither true (1) or false (-1) and X is claimed to be possible, X remains at 0.
b) The claim “X is possible” itself is epistemically true as all claims are at the very least (unless someone makes a claim they know to be false, which is then a lie by definition as they are deliberately making an untruthful claim) - for this to apply, one would need to (think they) know “X is not possible” but make the claim “X is possible”.
Equivocation - largely addressed in the point above - confusing “true” being applied in different kinds of claim (truth-value vs epistemic truth)
Fallacy fallacy - claims of my argument being fallacious, incorrectly.
Ignoratio Elenchi (some of these fallacies sound less like fallacies and more like spells in the Harry Potter series - please don’t say this one out loud just in case) - missing the point fallacy. You’re making arguments that may work in certain contexts, but in the context that is present, they don’t match my argument.
I’m not sure what you were even trying to say here.
You literally acknowledged you haven’t seen my link - for four days - by your own admission you have (inadvertently) ignored the link and the fact you haven’t even noticed you hadn’t seen it for four days worth of back and forth demonstrates you were ignoring my comments referencing the link too. This supports my claim of proof by assertion fallacy. You ignored evidence and arguments I provided.
I find it strange you would even ask me this. But then, given how much has been ignored over the discussion, it doesn’t seem so strange in retrospect.
Once again, I quote from the earliest stages of this argument - 12 days ago, September 4th:
And to quote myself from further up in this very comment:
“3) The fact that the idea is unfalsifiable as per your own admission only serves to prove it must be possible. Something can’t be unfalsifiable and not possible by definition, these are mutually exclusive.”
The link was literally already there. Notice how I said “Right here as re-quoted” - why are you asking me to offer the link yet again?
and right after you ask me to offer you the link, you acknowledge it? You do know you can delete earlier parts of your comment before posting it? Telling me to post the link again and then saying you can see it, doesn’t make sense.
Yes, the link is a pdf format file for the article that addresses the whole point of “possibility”.
I understand you’ve worked many hours. I’m working while replying to your comments. You’re not being forced to provide a response within a certain timeframe - I would sooner wait patiently for a response that has taken my full comment into consideration than a comment arriving quickly that ignores the arguments I made and just repeats the same lines ad infinitum.
I had already quoted from the link, presumably you missed all those quotes too, along with my repeated references to the quotes. Did you also miss when I kept explaining the differences between epistemic possibility, objective possibility and nomological possibility? I’m not asking you to do any research for my points - I did the research, I provided the link and I quoted from it to support my position. If you’re going to ignore my quotes, links and arguments for any reason, we’re not going to get anywhere if you stick to the same argument points because of it.
Here are the pertinent quotes yet again:
Of course, I made points and gave explanations around those quotes to link them back to my arguments and refute your points. If you disagree with the relevance of the quotes, an honest action would be to either scroll up to 12th September and look at my original comment and arguments with those quotes, or click the / arrow for the quote to see it in context before addressing them.
Not sure if you meant to leave this here at the end of your comment, but the fact I sourced the link as quoted, and quoted from the link numerous times to support my argument, and have been referencing the wording in the link to further re-iterate the points made highlights how I have satisfied the burden of proof.
That works both ways though. You have made numerous claims and the burden is yours.
Note: I understand you are busy, and if you take however long you need to take, I’ll be here. I won’t consider the absence of a response to mean anything other than you being too busy to reply, or deciding you have better things to do than to reply, or any equivalent neutral state. It would be fallacious for anyone to claim a “win” from silence.
Yes, my point of it being a valid idea was in the context of epistemological limitations, nothing more.
I’m not justifying the claim that there is a simulated world, I’m not expressing any form of belief in there being a simulated world, and I’m not saying it should have any belief invested in it. It just serves as a good example to contextualise knowledge.
My other comment in response to your other comment addresses the arguments you repeat here, so I won’t confuse things by repeating my responses again.
(1) If it’s an unfalsifiable concept then we have no knowledge, and beliefs are not justified, only agnosticism.
(2) This a different claim to your initial one that I disputed as fallacious:
a) You asserted that if not proved impossible, then it is possible.
b) I have not ruled out, nor have I suggested ruling out anything, as I have explained withholding belief from a claim is not the same as asserting it’s negation.
That doesn’t support your position as you asserted (initially at least) that something is possible unless it’s proved impossible, those are different claims.
Again what this has to do with your initial claim, that I asserted was fallacious, is unclear?
Well again, this doesn’t address your initial claim, and that was in relation to unfalsifiable concept (a deity & then the notion all reality might be an illusion).
(1) Total ignorance would be a justifiable hindrance to just such assertions, as with an unfalsifiable claim. Or even a claim that might conceive of some ways to falsify, but are impractical. If someone asserted it’s possible a prehistoric monster is in Loch Ness, then they would need to demonstrate something beyond it not having been disproved, and we might conceive of ways here to actually falsify such a claim.
(2) Not a reasonable comparison, since it is an objective fact that rain on this planet, and life within this solar system are possible.
If it’s unfalsifiable, and I think it is, then agnosticism is the reasonable response. The same with all unfalsifiable claims of course, god claims in the generic sense are no different, bringing it back to the original context.
Busy is a doddle, I worked 93 hours last week, I have had just 4 days off in the last 9 weeks, and last week is not the most hours I’ve worked in one week in that period, and this is likely to continue at least until Xmas, but I have to make hay.
The key words here are “claims about what is compatible”
In terms of “a given body of knowledge or justified beliefs”, compatibility means not contrary to known constraints.
This is different to nomological possibility which sets a higher bar - as it requires it to be objectively evidenced as possible. Epistemic possibility only requires it to be known not to be impossible (is not incompatible).
On this basis:
If it’s an unfalsifiable concept then we have no knowledge, then it cannot by definition be incompatible with our knowledge or justified beliefs, therefore it is possible by default because it hasn’t breached that compatibility.
This is the same claim. And is supported as per: “(2) To say that some proposition p is epistemically possible, is roughly to say that we cannot, given what we know, rule out that p is true”
a) “If not proved impossible, then it is possible” - correct. “we cannot, given what we know, rule out that p is true” - p is possible by default unless we can rule it out given what we know. Ergo, p is possible.
b) Exactly - if something cannot be ruled out, as per a, then it is possible. If you don’t know, then it is possible.
As proven above, it does support my position as asserted that something is possible unless it is proved impossible (we cannot rule out that p is possible)
I was providing descriptions of the different types of possibility for clarity. I did also state that the specific statement that was initially made - that a [matrix style simulation] was also objectively possible.
Again, I quoted this for clarity, and for this particular quote, I also acknowledged this reflected your argument - that a claim of something being nomologically possible would need evidence, and failure to evidence it would be an argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy.
I do agree however that my claim was not a matter of nomological possibility, and I had stated this when providing this quote originally.
Also, in regards to this specifically:
At no point in this discussion have I made any claims regarding a deity. It was specifically the possibility of a matrix style simulated world.
You seem to be misunderstanding what you have quoted. These were not my words, they were a quote from the scholarly article I linked, so you’re not arguing with me there, you’re arguing with the quoted article, as per:
If you disagree with the scholarly article, you would have the burden of proof to dispute my supporting evidence.
I have no issue with you or anyone being agnostic on such things. However, it doesn’t change the point that it is epistemically possible.
As for god claims, I haven’t made any claims here about deities. It was just about the matrix-style simulation, and that (epistemically) possible is the default position, as I have evidenced.
I’ve gone through such “rigours” also. I think I made the argument that DMT trips may point to the possibility that there is a “DMT realm” out there, where users of DMT experience the same supernatural features (spirit guides, etc). I was shut down by @Sheldon with the same general attack he’s launching on you now. To the point where even the possibility of there being a DMT realm (as suggested by shared experiences) was outright dismissed as “not possible”. Granted, DMT users are hallucinating, etc etc. I take it for granted that the “debate” room is also a place for general discussion. But that does not appear to be Sheldon’s stance. Anyway. I applaud your efforts here. I do think Sheldon’s best way to save face at this juncture is to admit that he was interested only in the nomonological possibility and cut his losses. As I said, Sheldon is operating under a set of fixed definitions and beliefs which he isn’t willing to admit might be different than yours. Which isn’t a problem per se, except that he isn’t willing to admit that his original definitions or underlying assumptions may have been lacking. Anyhow. Enough Metadiscussion. I’ve yet to see Sheldon back down from a war like this. And now you are in a war. It will a “scorched earth” policy at this point. Believe me …
The key words were your original claim, I have emboldened them.
Not sure why this is being ignored, but there is and can be no knowledge in the context of whether an unfalsifiable idea is possible or not, that’s what unfalsifiable means, we have no way to test or falsify the idea, and thus no way of knowing if it is in fact false or not.
Or impossible, you’ve told me nothing at all about it’s possibility, because you can’t, obviously.
Then the claim you made is not that it is possible if not proved impossible, but that we can’t rule out it being possible or impossible, again this tells me nothing about its possibility, and again this is true of all unfalsifiable claims.
Your initial claim was not that we can’t rule it out, and of course it would be equally true that we can’t rule it out being impossible, again we know nothing about its possibility, and again this is true of all unfalsifiable ideas and claims.
The debate has spilled over from a previous claim when I asserted I knew of no objective evidence that any deity existed or was possible, but they both appear to be unfalsifiable ideas so we don’t know whether they are possible or not, that’s what unfalsifiable means.
I explained this above.
Then you should have said that at the start, and again that no knowledge we possess rules out something being possible, does not mean it is possible, and in the case of unfalsifiable concepts be they imagined deities or separate undetectable realities that make ours an illusion, we can’t know whether they are possible or not.
I was disagreeing that it supported your original assertion.
And the key words I mentioned support my original claim.
So something is possible, as long as it is compatible with a given body of knowledge or justified beliefs.
For something to be compatible with knowledge or justified beliefs, it can’t contravene any known or justifiably believed constraints. Ergo, something is possible by default unless one has knowledge or justified belief that would render it impossible.
Exactly. That is the point I made. if there is no knowledge, then there’s no incompatibility. Incompatibility requires knowledge to make such a determination.
This aligns with the article I quoted:
If it cannot be ruled out, it is possible by default.
And as you acknowledge it is unfalsifiable, it must be possible because that’s the whole point of it being unfalsifiable - it can’t be ruled out as impossible.
It can’t be impossible, because it’s unfalsifiable. Impossible is a claim of certainty. Possible is a claim of uncertainty
To say something “may” be impossible must also mean it “may” be possible. To say something is impossible is a claim of certainty, that something is impossible and therefore in no way possible. Possible doesn’t have that same measure of certainty. If you say “it is possible”, it makes no claim of certainty.
The article I linked supports this, again:
You acknowledge that as something is unfalsifiable, we can’t know, which as per the quote, given that we cannot know - cannot rule out - it must be possible, by default.
No, you’re misreading it. It literally tells you about its possibility when it says “proposition p is epistemically possible” if it cannot be ruled out otherwise. Ergo, it is possible by default.
Yes, but if we can’t rule it out being impossible, that doesn’t change the fact it’s still possible. And yes, it is true of all unfalsifiable ideas and claims - they are (epistemically) possible by default.
Well, I am speaking from my involvement in the debate, but either way, as above, something that is unfalsifiable is possible by default, along with all the other unfalsifiable things, and the falsifiable things that have not yet been falsified.
As above, if we cannot rule out something, then it is epistemically possible by default, as per the quote I have already quoted numerous times saying this.
The fact that we can’t know is a position of uncertainty. Possibility is a position of uncertainty. They align.
No, you quoted the quote I posted from the article and you were arguing with that, as per:
As per the quote, the article makes the claim that ignorance is no hinderance to justified claims of epistemic possibility, yet you have disagreed with this by saying total ignorance would be a justifiable hinderance. Therefore my point still stands - if you disagree with the scholarly article, you have the burden of proof to evidence your disagreement with my supporting evidence.
No, just epistemically possible. Impossibility is a claim of certainty that would require evidence, whereas possibility is a claim of uncertainty (not otherwise known, not ruled out).
I disagree, in your original claim you never mentioned epistemically possible, but hey ho, and this also means it might be impossible, the two claims ostensibly mean the same thing. As of course you’d expect from an unfalsifiable claim.
You mean epistemically, all that is saying is that we don’t know it’s possible / impossible, this was not of course clear in your original claim.
Then epistemically possible means it still might be impossible, of course, since nothing in our totality of knowledge rules this out. Again this is almost trivially true for unfalsifiable claims.
Not sure how many times I must reiterate, but I never claimed to, or even mentioned ruling anything out, though it is obvious that we cannot rule out it being impossible, again for any unfalsifiable claim this is almost trivially true. And not what your initial claim said.
It certainly can be impossible, we just don’t know, now you are ruling something out with certainty, based on a lack of knowledge.
Here is an article that illustrates your original fallacy, from a rather obvious or famous source, Sherlock Holmes:
"In The Sign of Four , Holmes asks Watson: “How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?”
“Well, the fallacy would not be in Sherlock Holmes line; that remains perfectly valid. The fallacy would be in the hubris of the person who did not carefully conduct an exhaustive search for alternatives. In order to use “whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth” you must exhaust the space of possibilities first. If you didn’t do that, you are not entitled to appeal to Sherlock Holmes!”
With an unfalsifiable claim such alternatives are not known, cannot be known.
If you said we have no knowledge that rules out the possibility of a deity, ok fine, but then you’d have to accurately define such a deity, and nothing about that definition could contradict our current knowledge. What would that look like?
Except I never said anything was impossible, I said there was nothing in our current totality of knowledge that ruled it out, thus it might be impossible, again by your own rationale. So no it is not a claim of certainty, though your original claim made no such qualification of course.
I don’t know if a deity in its generic sense (for example) is possible, or impossible, thus I must remain agnostic about both claims.
Indeed not, nor have I ever claimed to be ruling it out. Though of course we cannot rule it out being impossible. We cannot know one without knowing the other, claiming one to be a default position in the complete absence of knowledge either way is simply bias.
And again I never said I ruled anything out, and you never said we cannot rule it out being possible, in your original claim. Though this may have been what you meant, I cannot know.
I am not misreading it, you never said epistemically possible in your original claim, and you seem tellingly to have omitted the word here?
What Sherlock Holmes said was valid, but the fallacy lay in his hubris.
To claim a deity is epistemically possible, is no different to claiming mermaids are epistemically possible, or any imaginary thing, and certainly any unfalsifiable concept, and they are very easy to create.
Though of course others are free to find such arguments compelling. My only claim was that I knew of no objective evidence that any deity existed, or was even possible. NB see the word objective in there.
No, it is epistemically possible, lets not go back to the original fallacy. It is not objectively possible. Now remember the start of this where I prompted your original claim:
I am not aware of any objective evidence that a deity exists, or is even possible. I even explained explicitly that this was not a claim a deity was impossible, and of course we are dealing with an undefined deity at that point.
Not ruling out either position, or agnosticism, is a position of unbiased uncertainty.
Because your original claim was not one for epistemic possibility. Now you have added this, you’re not disagreeing with my original claim:
I know of no objective evidence that any deity exists, or is even possible. For proper context.
Your error is in trying to pretend one position involves certainty, when they are both merely defining the same epistemological limits, though I’d change epistemically impossible to might still be impossible, I misspoke, mea culpa.
Nothing in our total collective knowledge rules out a deity being impossible (I must add the caveat, this is not true of all god claims, only unfalsifiable god claims). Nothing in our collective knowledge demonstrates a deity is objectively possible. This btw was my original position.
If I am wrong, then by all means present the knowledge that has thus far escaped me.
I addressed this point in the comment where I first mentioned the article and linked it, including a quote from the article itself that acknowledged this very point:
and I went on to clarify in the context of our discussion:
And yes, it does also mean it might be impossible. But “might be impossible” by definition still means something is possible, because the impossibility hasn’t been established as a certainty. Something being possible by default still means it might be impossible, or might never be/happen. That aspect does not contradict anything I have said.
The context and my explanations made it clear it was epistemic possibility. Also as supported by the article I quoted from as above.
Yes, again, that is correct - I haven’t said otherwise. I have acknowledged this in our discussion numerous times.
You don’t need to reiterate. I haven’t claimed that you did say anything about ruling anything out. What you did say numerous times is that my claim that things are possible by default was wrong. The point that something is possible by default if it cannot be ruled out as impossible is where the ruling out applies.
My initial claim said that something was possible, and then after that point I stated that things are possible by default, unless they are determined otherwise (i.e., unless they are ruled out as impossible)
No, I am ruling out a claim of certainty. You said “or impossible” - it can only be said it might be impossible. You can’t claim something is impossible unless it is epistemically known, objectively known, or nomologically known to be impossible depending on the context.
Possible is the default position, which inherently means something might be impossible, but can’t be claimed to be impossible as a certainty.
And in regards to something being unfalsifiable, it can never be claimed impossible, because it is unfalsifiable. That term would first need to be dropped (i.e., something would need to be falsifiable) for it to be possible to claim it is impossible.
Fallacy fallacy again. As per the Sherlock Holmes quote, Sherlock is going further and making a truth claim. This is a nomological possibility - things have been eliminated as nomologically impossible, so if one possibility remains it is deemed the truth by process of elimination.
I have not advocated anything being claimed to be true. I have not said it is true that we are in a matrix-world style simulation, etc.
To the contrary, I repeatedly stated that calling something possible does not assign any truth-value to the claim.
The only “truth” we have agreed I have stated is the truth of the claim for the concept of possibility itself - that epistemic possibility is the default state when something has not been ruled out as impossible. I have provided a quote from a scholarly article to support the truth of that claim, and I have distinguished the truth of that claim from any truth-value claim of anything being declared possible.
“If I said…” but I haven’t said, so that’s a moot point.
We have no objectively evidenced knowledge of metaphysics in an empirical, scientific sense, so many metaphysical possibilities would struggle to contradict current knowledge anyway. So while I’m not making any such arguments, I don’t see how there could be much resistance to such (for what it’s worth).
Except you did when you responded to my statement that something is possible by default if it hasn’t been ruled out as impossible, as per:
If you didn’t mean to word that as a claim, then there is no argument - I only responded on the basis of how it was worded.
I did when I stated, originally (September 6th):
As per that quote, I acknowledged that impossibility had not been determined, hence why something was possible. This highlighted the uncertainty of possibility.
I also directly stated it the next day, September 7th:
It’s not bias, it’s a recognition of the linguistic meaning, and the fact that (epistemic) possibility is a position of uncertainty. The article I quoted supports this.
Again, I never said you did say that. Same response as above. As for my original claim, again, same response as above.
As per my previous response, I have quoted the article already about the context establishing which possibility (espistemic, objective, nomological, metaphysical) is being referred to.
I didn’t claim a deity is possible, but your point is correct, and I had already acknowledged this very point from the outset, and directly addressed it early on, as per September 7th:
So, we agree it is epistemically possible. Good. That’s a step forward. Though as per my quote further up, when the word “possible” is used without stating the specific type, the context indicates which one is meant. Given that I have been describing epistemic possibility in reference to the claim, by stating early on in the discussion (September 7th) that:
This highlights I was referring to epistemic possibility, because I contingently based it on an absence of knowledge.
Whereas nomological possibility wouldn’t be based on an absence of knowledge, it would require knowledge supporting the possibility.
Once again, the original claim was prompted by my stating that a matrix-world style simulation was a valid idea.
Also, just to add, as before, in terms of objective possibility, that also doesn’t require evidence to support something being possible, only nomological possibility does.
The difference between epistemic possibility and objective possibility is the source of knowledge. Epistemic is one’s own knowledge or justified beliefs; objective is the corpus of knowledge. In both cases, it is a question of the knowledge ruling out something as impossible.
With nomological possibility, this is where scientific hypotheses often fit - the requirement to prove something is possible within the corpus of knowledge.
So even though I have been explaining that what I have discussed is epistemically possible, I have also pointed out that ideas such as a matrix-world style simulation is also objectively possible.
I would not be able to argue that it was nomologically possible, as this would require objective evidence supporting the capability of a simulation to sufficiently simulate the world, etc.
Saying something is possible doesn’t rule out either position - hence it being a position of uncertainty.
I have not engaged with that claim or attempted to disagree with it at any point. My claim again was about a matrix-world style simulation being a valid idea.
Throughout this discussion you have mentioned deity/deities, and each time I have responded to state I was not addressing that. At most in this comment alone I have responded with a statement on metaphysical claims generally.
My arguments throughout have also fully aligned with there being no objective evidence for anything being called possible - that it was a position of uncertainty, not an evidenced claim.
“Impossible” is a position of certainty. “might be impossible” (or equivalent variations) is a position of uncertainty because of the conditional word “might”.
My argument to this end has remained consistent.
Nothing in our total collective knowledge rules out a matrix-world style simulation being epistemically or objectively impossible (I must add the point that nothing at all could ever rule it out as being impossible by virtue of a simulation overriding the concept of proof/evidence). Based on my own epistemic knowledge and my own understanding of the corpus of knowledge, nothing demonstrates a matrix-world style simulation is nomologically possible.
Again, as for metaphysical claims, objective possibility is dependent on whether something is ruled out by the corpus of knowledge. The corpus of knowledge does not rule out metaphysical claims of the nature you mention.
(For clarity, this is now the 2nd reference I have made to the metaphysical in this comment, in reference to your arguments about deities, and as before, I have not made any such claims prior other than stating I was not disputing or making counter-claims in relation to your arguments about a deity/deities)
It does seem like we are at least in agreement now on epistemic possibility being the default position; that the idea of a matrix-world style simulation is valid in terms of epistemic and objective possibility, and that I am not disputing or challenging the statements you have made about objective evidence not existing for (specific) metaphysical claims, although they can be objectively possible, just not claimed to be nomologically possible.
If you agree on these points, then it does appear that we have reached an accord.
So you said and I addressed it being different to your original claim, you introduced the [phrase epistemic possibility later, the article does support your original claim.
See your original claim, we seem now to be arguing about different things.
You seem to have dropped the word epistemically again? You have gone from your new qualified claim, to your original absolute claim.
Neither has the possibility, that’s the point.
That’s not what you said in your original claim.
So it means it might be objectively possible or might be objectively impossible, which was not made clear in the original claim.
"In philosophy and modal logic, epistemic possibility relates a statement under consideration to the current state of our knowledge about the actual world: a statement is said to be:
epistemically possible if it may be true, for all we know"
Contrast that to something that has not been proved impossible, is possible.
Because you are again claiming an absolute, the word epistemically seems to have been omitted again, which is odd given the lengths you went to to explain that it is a very different claim to something being objectively possible, and as the quote above assets merely means it might be possible, or might be impossible, as you have now agreed, here:
Indeed, but the fallacy lies in it being an unfalsifiable concept, not in the claim itself, and the idea you weren’t making a truth claim has been addressed. Again you never qualified the claim in your (originally) assertion. maybe this was an error and you meant epistemically possible, but that is not what you wrote. I addressed what you wrote.
Not the original claim, why this is being repeated is unclear? We have both agreed that epistemically possible means it might be possible or might be impossible. I have no problem with that, as I have said.
It’s relevant as I can only address what it is said, and hence my objections are not being argued against a qualified different claim, but hey ho, we are in agreement that epistemically possible means it might be possible, or might be impossible.
Is there any kind of objective evidence for a metaphysical deity? I mean we all arbitrarily set a threshold for credulity, but is it accepts as evidence for one claim that which it disbelieves for another, then to me this indicative of bias. Hence I treat all unfalsifiable claims the same, though of course we don’t know here if your deity is an unfalsifiable concept. I don’t believe our reality is entirely an illusion, for the same reason I would not believe any unfalsifiable claim, I also don’t believe thet are objectively possible, again for the same reason.
I see no claim that anything is impossible there, only a qualifying statement that we don’t know and thus it might be. You have also now agreed that this is the case:
Not really, if you’d been specific and added the word epistemically it would have been clear, again this may be what you meant, but it is not what you said. Though this seems moot now that you have agreed it means it might be possible for all we know, but might also be impossible.
No that prompted me to repeat my objection to your original claim about a deity, but they are in this context the same claim, or least the same typed of claim. That is to say if an idea is unfalsifiable we cannot know whether they are possible or not, which is all I have said from the start.
Indeed, hence my objection, epistemically possible does not mean it is possible, and I asserted I knew of no objective evidence that a deity existed to was even possible, then you objected and said it was possible if we didn’t know it to be impossible. You meant epistemically possible, and that is an odd response to my assertion, as very specifically used phrase (as i always do) objective evidence.
What observable facts or observable realities support this?
Not in this thread, but in the other thread you did, if I had time I would usually dig out a quote, but sadly time is at premium right now, work constraints and all. If I am wrong I will of course retract, as I always do when I occasionally err.
It literally does. As per that quote, it states that if something is called possible, but isn’t specifically stated as ‘epistemic’ or ‘objective’, the context will often indicate which is being referenced. As per my previous comment, the various explanations I gave highlighted this.
It’s also not a one way street either. When you disagreed, you didn’t state nomological possibility. You can’t accuse me of not being clear enough when I explained my meaning, which was sufficient to indicate it was epistemic possibility, and your opposition did not reference a specific form of possibility (nomological).
The article’s main purpose is actually to address how different scientific articles switch between types of possibility without specifically stating whether they are epistemic, objective, metaphysical or nomological.
Also, note this doesn’t make it different to my claim. The word “possibility” is a term that includes epistemic possibility, objective possibility, metaphysical possibility, and nomological possibility. So using the word “possibility” without specifically stating which does not make it different to the original claim. The claim remains the same, it has just been clarified further.
I am arguing, as above, that epistemic possibility was evidenced from the explanations I gave.
You are demonstrably arguing that my not specifically distinguishing “epistemic possibility” over “possibility” is the issue.
What are you claiming you are arguing differently to me?
Again, the context highlights I am referring to epistemic possibility. It doesn’t need to be mentioned, and it doesn’t need to be mentioned every single time. Epistemic possibility is still possibility. Possibility is going to be one of the types of possibility. The context indicates which it is, as per the quote in the article which supports this.
No. The point is, as I mentioned multiple times in my last comment, possibility is a position of uncertainty. So possibility doesn’t need to be established as a certainty - if it was then it would be more than just possibility, it would be certainty. I am not arguing for certainty, just possibility.
Burden of proof. If you are claiming that the context and my explanations didn’t make it clear it was epistemic possibility, you need to evidence this. I have provided quotes from my original arguments that support my claim. If you are claiming otherwise, you need to support this.
Also, even if you were not sure which possibility I was meaning, that would only support it being uncertain. You didn’t state that you were meaning a specific type of possibility either, so you can’t stand apart from this point - it affects both sides of the argument equally, and I have evidenced my position.
Means the same. saying something is possible means it may be possible. Possible is a position of uncertainty. Possible is potential - a may be, may be not. It’s not saying it will be or it is. When I say a matrix-world style simulation is possible, it is not saying we are in a simulation, it is saying it may be - that we cannot rule it out as impossible.
It doesn’t need to add “may” or “might” be possible to distinguish this. Saying “is possible” inherently means this, from an epistemic and objective possibility standpoint. Only nomological possibility takes it further by requiring it to be evidenced as something we know could be done with the necessary resources and circumstances.
You keep claiming it is a very different claim, but it isn’t. saying things are possible by default is the same as saying things are epistemically possible by default, or things are objectively possible by default.
If someone says, “my pet sheds hair all over the house”, the context (shedding hair) means they are referring to a pet with hair. If the person also happens to have a pet fish, it doesn’t mean they are referring to the hairless fish. If someone else argues with the person saying “your pet does no such thing”, who do you think is correct?
The context indicates which pet(s) they are referring to. If after a lengthy discussion, the person says, “my pet cat sheds hair”, the other person wouldn’t be able to make a logical argument the claim is now very different, that at first they said pet, and now they’re saying pet cat.
Epistemic possibility is a subtype of the word possibility. Just like scientific evidence is a subtype of the word evidence. Someone can say evidence and mean scientific evidence, or legal evidence, objective evidence, etc. - if a claim is made that evidence is not present, someone can answer it and say “but there is evidence as per x, y, z” and the first person can then respond, “but that evidence is not objective evidence.”
In that example, evidence can be counted as meaning multiple different things, and two people can consider it meaning two different things. The point is though that it is not incorrect to use a term such as “evidence” or “possibility” without stating which is meant, but clarity can help in an argument. Another point is that when an encompassing term is used, it doesn’t preclude a point that addresses a specific context/form for that term - the point made establishes the context.
For example, if someone says “there is no evidence that can be tested and the findings reproduced”, it is indicated that the person is talking about objective evidence to a scientific standard, and not something like a witness testimony.
As above, possibility can be epistemic possibility. They’re not different claims. One is just more specifically stated. The context made it clear I was referring to epistemic possibility. Your argument also didn’t state nomological possibility, so your opposition wasn’t any clearer.
Not sure why you’re asking a question I literally just answered in the quote you quoted. Your answer is there. Unless you’re asking about non-empirical, non-scientific objective evidence, but from my understanding of your use of “objective evidence”, you mean the empirical, scientific kind… kinda like how when I used the term “possibility” I was referring to the epistemic kind.
Objectively possible - different to nomologically possible - is when something is not ruled out by the corpus of knowledge. Something unfalsifiable (unless not objectively recognised as unfalsifiable) must be objectively possible by default because it objectively cannot be ruled out by the corpus of knowledge.
Whether or not you believe it to be anything is your choice, but it is objectively possible - meaning it has not been ruled out as impossible by the corpus of knowledge - also meaning it is being claimed to “may be possible”, which is a position of uncertainty.
“therefore it is possible by default” = a claim that something is possible (may be possible) by default
“or impossible” = in the context of the above quote, saying “or impossible” means to swap “possible” with “impossible”. This becomes “therefore it is impossible by default” - as the first quote was a claim (possible by default) then “or impossible” must also be a claim (impossible by default) with the swapped word.
As previously stated, “possible” is a position of uncertainty, whereas “impossible” is a position of certainty. So a claim for uncertainty (possible by default) is different to a claim of certainty (impossible by default)
That is what the “by default” is indicating - it is by default because uncertainty is the default. Anything that diverges from uncertainty is a claim of certainty.
Possible is “0”, impossible is “-1” (certainty on the negative scale) and “it is / it will be” is “1” (certainty on the positive scale)
“It is impossible that tomorrow is Wednesday.” (-1 = certainly impossible. Wednesday cannot follow Saturday)
“It is possible that there is no tomorrow” (0 = world might end)
“It will be Sunday tomorrow” (1 = Sunday is known to follow Saturday)
Note also that I just said it is possible that there is no tomorrow. Of course, you could disagree because nomologically, it would need to be evidenced that the world/universe could “end” (though technically the sun exploding/dying/etc. would rather rule out the concept of days), but it isn’t necessary to state what sort of possibility was being referred to when it was said to be possible - the context can be established as necessary, and nomological possibility is largely ruled out given that no evidence is being offered to support it being possible.
I didn’t make a claim about a deity. I have stated this repeatedly throughout the discussion.
September 6th in response to your question about whether I can demonstrate a deity is possible, I responded:
September 14th, rat_spit even acknowledged this point, and when you stated otherwise, I countered your point (September 15th)
And again on September 17th:
and September 18th, you indicated the debate was from a previous claim, and I clarified my position was based on my involvement in the debate, (i.e., not previous claims made with/by others)
and yesterday, September 19th, I once again clarified I hadn’t said this:
Again yesterday, I pointed out, as I am now, that you keep mentioning deities and I keep stating I was not addressing that, as per:
[quote=“fireflies, post:135, topic:6637”]
I have not engaged with that claim or attempted to disagree with it at any point. My claim again was about a matrix-world style simulation being a valid idea.
Throughout this discussion you have mentioned deity/deities, and each time I have responded to state I was not addressing that. [/quote]
and followed up with further confirmation:
But moving on to your next point…
Yet again, this is incorrect. Here is how the debate started:
Then:
and then…
You’ll note here also, that I make it clear that “possible” is a default state because it is “subject to change” (i.e., uncertain, may be possible, may be impossible) and that “something initially considered possible can be determined “impossible” with further evidence” - which also establishes epistemic/objective possibility, not nomological possibility.
It sounds like you’re getting confused.
Nomological possibility requires objective evidence to support the claim. Objective possibility only requires that the corpus of knowledge does not rule out something as impossible. You have acknowledged that a matrix-world style simulation is unfalsifiable, therefore by definition, the corpus of knowledge cannot rule it out as impossible (or it wouldn’t be unfalsifiable) so the claim it is possible is satisfied.
I did not, but even then what has been said in another thread is a different debate, a different discussion. To my knowledge, in other discussions I have only argued from hypothetical standpoints as needed to focus on the subject of the discussion without first trying to support a claim that I have already acknowledged does not have objective evidence (of an empirical, scientific nature)
It seems that arguing over the understanding of what was said before is largely moot. It has been clarified now - not as a different claim but as clarification of the claims that were made. My claims have been specifically in relation to epistemic possibility (as further clarified) and based on the initial statement that a matrix-world style simulation was a valid idea - was possible - and that possible is the default on the basis that it means something might be possible (uncertainty) whereas impossible is a position of certainty and saying something is impossible means it cannot be considered that it may be possible also.
We can of course continue arguing over these points, or it can be acknowledged that with clarification, the original points as clarified are correct.