Maybe. The venus flytrap is triggered by an insect walking in the trap, and I can argue that this is a “yes or no” situation like one bit of computer information.
No
No
Maybe, but depends upon your definition of supernatural. If there are alternate Universes, the physical laws may be different, and a being in this space would seem supernatural to us.
Don’t know. I can’t prove that there isn’t a God (or gods).
No
No
No
Yes. The evidence for evolution is so overwhelming, that to disbelieve in evolution is like believing in a flat Earth.
Well, trying to keep it as simple as possible: If you want to make green walls, you need green bricks—or at least yellow and blue bricks that can be combined to form green walls. Similarly, if qualia are material, then matter needs to have at least some qualia-like properties or proto-qualia properties that, when combined, can produce qualia. This implies that all material things either have qualia or proto-qualia properties, in the same way that all material things have charge or mass. This is why I say this is a necessary conclusion of materialism.
Are you asking me to solve the hard problem of consciousness on a Sunday?
I can list properties that, in my personal opinion, might form a basic building block of qualia—such as some form of fundamental experience when a particle interacts with another particle, or a very basic combination of these experiences when particles interact, like a current or something similar.
But this is just speculation from my part
You can find many references to this in David Chalmers’ work, for example:
Chalmers, D.J., 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford Paperbacks.
You said the above. If you are unable to name these proto-qualia properties, you apparently don’t know what they are. And yet, you make assertions about them. That, sir or madam, indicates a willingness to accept for all matter that for which you have no evidence. I, and some others here, withhold doing so.
You’re here arguing that something is the case without offering what I think is sufficient evidence, proof, demonstration, definition, specifics, assertion avoidance, etc. So, I call bullshit on this panpsychism you are pushing.
Ah! Speculation! Bingo!
I don’t care to do that. Chalmers is not posting in this forum. YOU are. I’ve been asking YOU questions, not Chalmers.
I see it differently. I just concluded that proto-qualia should exist in the same way that science concluded dark matter should exist. We can’t observe either of them directly—both dark matter and proto-qualia are beyond direct observation—yet we infer their existence because we observe their effects. In the case of dark matter, we see gravitational anomalies. In the case of proto-qualia, we experience first-person subjective consciousness.
Both are invisible to our instruments, leading to multiple speculations. In my opinion, one consequence of assuming that qualia are of material origin is panpsychism, which implies the existence of proto-qualia. The fact that we can’t precisely describe proto-qualia does not invalidate the possibility of their existence, just as our inability to describe what dark matter is doesn’t undermine speculations about its existence.
If it helps, I had a venus fly trap, and you could trigger the plant to close by touching the fine hairs that detect insects, they would still close. To me this suggests the action is involuntary, rather than an act of will.
I can agree on the surface, but there are other points that I think could be made about this process.
If the trap is open or closed, this can represent a 0 or a 1 in binary. If you touch the trap and trigger the trap, then it’s no different than biting into something that you thought was food, but isn’t.
The closure of the trap represents the plant’s interraction with the world, so by responding to a stimulus, can we not argue that this is a kind of (very simple) perception?
I can make similar arguments about the sensitive plant (Mimosa pudica).
Thus, by concluding the way you do with direct comparison to dark matter, you therefore implicitly open up to other explanations than your so-called proto-qualia to whatever effects in question, and concede that these might not be the only explanation, or even the correct explanation.
As long as we are unable to measure or observe qualia, we cannot logically confirm any of these hypotheses as definitive. However, at the moment, it seems to be the best explanation we have, from my viewpoint. Moreover, panpsychism appears to be the most straightforward explanation from a materialistic perspective—meaning it aligns best with Occam’s razor. The problem with this theory lies in its implications, which challenge the view that the universe is an inert entity. Even a small shift in interpretation can change everything.
Panpsychism cannot be empirically tested. Thus, it cannot be falsified (or confirmed, in the popperian sense), and has no predictive power. Effectively, it’s a non-explanation. And that is your best explanation?
If you want to even pretend to present something resembling facts about the real world, there is no way you can avoid empirical results and empirical tests. No empirical tests possible → the best you’ve got is an unsubstantiated hypothesis.