Disclaimer: The following post presents a detailed and extended defense of theism, along with a critical examination of atheism, from the philosophical standpoint of Hindu Pratyabhijna idealism. Because the discussion is necessarily elaborate and may be quite lengthy, readers are kindly requested to approach it with patience and an open mind, carefully considering the arguments and evaluating them in the light of sound reasoning, proper scientific understanding, and logical analysis.
An atheist position generally depends on rejecting the following kinds of arguments for theism:
1. Personal Experience
Atheists often overlook the fact that even the evaluation of supposedly objective empirical data occurs through our own psycho-physical apparatus. Neither colours nor numbers exist âout thereâ in themselves, and constructs such as the space-time continuum, latitudes, and longitudes are essentially more refined and accurate ways of describing what we observe , much like earlier explanations (e.g., demons swallowing the sun) were attempts to describe phenomena. The difference lies in degree of explanatory sophistication, not in kind. Even systems of measurement and arbitrary units are ultimately standardized subjective conventions.
Objection: Personal experience does not shape the objective world. Imagination is not the same as reality. Our conventions may be arbitrary, but they still correspond to real phenomena, unlike something like a âspaghetti monster,â which has no observational basis. Scientific theories are tested and confirmed against observed data.
Response: But is that really so? Does a bat perceive the world the same way you do?
Objection: Bats detect certain sensory inputs that humans cannot directly perceive. Something nonexistent cannot be perceived.
Response: If that is the case, how do we perceive a dragon?
Objection: We do not actually perceive dragons.
Response: Then how do we speak about them?
Opponent: Because we imagine them.
Response: If we imagine them, does imagination somehow escape perception? If so, how do we perceive imagination, hallucinations, or dreams?
Opponent: What you experience is simply the result of neural activity in your brain. These things exist only in your head.
Response: But do we not experience everything through our heads? What exactly distinguishes something âimaginedâ from something considered ârealâ? Do properties like colour exist objectively in the external world? Physically speaking, colours correspond to certain wavelengths of vibration. Yet the perception of motion or vibration itself is relative and dependent on our frame of reference. When something appears to move, how do we know whether it is the object vibrating or our perception shifting? How do we distinguish motion itself from the perception of motion?
No supposedly objective observation can completely remove the subjective framework through which all knowledge is filtered. Even inductive scientific methods are devised through human conventions, and their results are interpreted through prior conceptual assumptions.
Opponent: This is because matter exists independently. The motion of particles exists regardless of our perception; otherwise it would be subject to our will like imagination. Therefore an external world must exist, and the patterns we observe are independent of subjective judgment. Errors arise only from our incomplete understanding.
Response: Are our emotions subject to our will? If so, why do hallucinations occur? They are clearly not voluntary.
Opponent: Because of defects in neural processes. The physical world is a closed system.
Response: A closed system is not what is being questioned here. That criticism applies to Cartesian dualism, where two distinct substances interact inexplicably. Our position instead rejects materialism and maintains that the closed system is not material in nature. Moreover, if hallucinations arise purely from defective physical processes, what evidence proves that ordinary perception is not itself the result of some âdefectâ? How exactly do we define ânormalâ perception when normative standards themselves are arbitrary? A bat perceives wavelengths we cannot detect so whose perception is defective?
Objection: But without a mind-independent reality, the diversity of subjective experiences regarding the same object would be impossible.
Response: What exactly is this âmaterial substratumâ? The qualities used to define it such as extension, solidity, colour, motion etc have already been shown to depend on subjective conditions. If sensory systems change, the perceived object becomes entirely different. How would a bacterium perceive the same object?
Objection: Can colour be perceived without an objective frequency behind it?
Response: How can you directly prove a frequency you never observe without interpretation? Numerical systems themselves are conceptual constructs. Colours are qualitative experiences in the brain, yet we have no clear explanation of how colourless neurons produce coloured experience. Similarly, physical processes are described objectively, but they somehow give rise to subjective awareness - something not apparent in the processes themselves.
The concept of frequency relies on the idea of waves, which again is interpreted through our perception of motion relative to a resting medium. Motion and rest are defined only relative to one another. Even in physics, concepts like kinetic and potential energy are interdependent; one cannot be fully defined without reference to the other. Likewise, notions such as mass or space-time curvature remain theoretical constructs used to model observations. Saying that time dilation occurs because of âspace-time curvatureâ is still a model , essentially a mathematical representation of observations.
If nothing purely objective is directly accessible, what kind of âobjective evidenceâ can be demanded? Objects independent of perception remain unobserved and therefore unproven. Yet whatever is perceived must in some sense exist for perception to occur at all.
Objection: But without actual atomic vibration, frequency and motion could not be perceived.
Response: What exactly is this âatomâ? Physics itself debates whether it behaves as a particle or a wave, and the physical meaning of wave-function collapse remains controversial. What we possess is an effective mathematical framework that predicts observations accurately, but the underlying ontology remains uncertain.
Furthermore, when we recall a perception from memory, the external atom is absent, yet the experience appears again internally. If similar neural processes can produce similar experiences in both cases, the empirical distinction between perception and imagination becomes less clear.
Opponent: This is just a âGod of the gapsâ argument.
Response: The gap is quite large, while the areas we claim to understand are comparatively small. Even classical physics relies on approximations. Our empirical instruments are limited, and the results they provide are never perfectly precise. Empirical knowledge is therefore provisional. Rationalism alone fares no better, because logic itself depends on conceptual frameworks that vary across different systems.
Consider the law of identity. It states that if x = a, then whatever happens to x happens to a. Yet two truly identical entities would effectively be indistinguishable. Equality itself is a relation, and relations presuppose plurality. If two things are truly the same in every respect, they cease to be two.
Similarly, other logical principles such as the law of excluded middle or certain inductive assumptions can also be examined critically based on their practical effectiveness rather than their absolute certainty.
Objection: Yet you still accept relations.
Response: Yes, but as diversity emerging from an underlying unity. Relations become possible precisely because of this deeper unity of consciousness. Without such unity, no relation between distinct elements could be established at all.
Objection: This still sounds like an argument from ignorance.
Response: not quite. Iâm pointing out the flaws of the scientific method. I have made no resort to any claims science has not verified except perhaps the physical relevance of the quantum wave function collapse. But I guess scientists and us both agree, the physical relevance of the collapse , no matter whether it be understood as per the Copenhagen, Many worlds, Bohm Pilot wave models, is all inconsequential since the collapse matches experimental data. Science has verified it is inept in providing accurate results and it can never reach hundred percent accuracy, even in regards to problems most mundane since the moment a recurring decimal or such occurs, or complex numbers enter the game, results come crashing down to approximations, âclosets to the truth and yet never the truthâ. Even the representationalists argue using the same trick of being aware of external objects without these objects ever being objectively perceptible. On the other hand, what do you mean by an argument from ignorance? Science and scientists openly accept the very question of the physical relevance of quantum wave function collapse is incorrect do they not? âIt is worthless to ask what an atom is doing when nobody is looking at it" says the same scientists. If science admits the illogical nature of the question itself, appealing to it and denying that it is inexplicable for now and Evermore cannot be said to be an argument from ignorance. Something inexplicable now may be explained later on but science or at least some scientists are of the opinion that this cannot be explained not now not ever, no matter how advanced we may become. As such an allegation of âargument from ignorance" is uncalled for. We merely demonstrate the possibility of acquisition of knowledge which was formerly deemed impossible to achieve at all.
2. Denial of the causal proof
For starters, a common objection states that if everything has a cause, then God must also have a cause. However, if this line of reasoning is accepted, it immediately leads to infinite regress. If infinite regress is treated as valid, numerous philosophical problems arise. For instance, if the universe were infinitely extended into the past, it would take an infinite amount of time to arrive at the present moment, which appears impossible.
People also tend to overlook that the statement âeverything has a causeâ would itself require a cause. What causes everything to âhave a causeâ? In other words, the argument becomes self-defeating. The first premise is therefore incorrect: not everything has a cause. This is precisely why classical philosophy distinguishes between material causality and efficient causality.
Matter itself is insentient. It cannot produce the dynamism we call ânatural laws.â If matter possessed inherent dynamism within itself, it would not require energy in order to move. Moreover, while massâenergy equivalence has been demonstrated, this does not necessarily mean they are ontologically identical.
Cartesian dualism fails to properly explain causal interaction between mind and matter, but materialism faces its own serious difficulties. It struggles to explain how physical neurochemical processes give rise to qualitative experiences such as colour, texture, or aesthetic appreciation given that these qualities do not objectively exist âout there,â but correspond only to numerical values of wave frequencies or inert physical interactions that have no intrinsic âfeel.â
The materialist who argues that the world is a causally closed system also overlooks something important: we do not possess a perfect understanding of this supposedly âclosedâ system. Scientifically speaking, there are few clear ontological definitions. Most definitions describe observable processes rather than what these things fundamentally are. For example, energy itself lacks a precise ontic definition and is often described simply in terms of what it does or how it is observed.
Opponent: Why must such a question even arise? Is an ontological definition really necessary?
Response: If we attempt to explain the behaviour of something without knowing what it fundamentally is, that seems problematic. Behaviour normally derives from the essential nature of a substance. For example, water flows because it is fluid.
Opponent: Let us avoid the ontological route then. The material world is a closed causal system. Nothing external is required to initiate causality within it. Epistemic arguments alone are sufficient for denying Godâs existence.
Response: Any causal chain, when examined carefully, leads to infinite regress. When you say the system is closed, do you mean that the causal chains are circular?
Opponent: Some are circular, while others adopt an infinite model in which the universe is cyclical. In either case, an external God is unnecessary.
Response: Successive causal interactions taken linearly lead to infinite regress, whose difficulties have already been noted. If all objects are entirely interdependent, how can any objective empirical data arise? The circular model faces similar issues. If causal relations require infinite duration, it becomes impossible for any event to occur at all, which is a clear absurdity.
Objection: The universe is non-local. It cannot depend on a single mind. Idealism often collapses into solipsism, which is itself contradictory.
Response: We do not advocate solipsism. Even idealists such as Kant or Berkeley did not support such a position. Rather, we maintain a form of objective realism within consciousness. By âmind,â I specifically mean spirit, not the brain or a cluster of mnemonic impressions (memories), which are themselves experiential phenomena. We affirm one absolute subject, within which all limited subjects exist. In such a framework, solipsism does not arise.
If only a limited cognizer existed, and his mind alone constituted reality, then his limited knowledge would form an absolute boundary. For example, a blind person has no sensory understanding of visual information. If solipsism were true, genuinely new information could never arise. This conclusion appears counterintuitive.
Objection: Then what is the mechanical process by which mind creates reality?
Response: By the same token, explain how emergent properties arise from entities that seemingly possess no relation to those properties. There is no definitive explanation for that either.
Objection: But what about causality? Something nonexistent cannot suddenly become manifest.
Response: Yet manifestation itself presupposes that prior to manifestation the object was not manifest.
Objection: So you reject the principle that the effect pre-exists in the cause?
Response: Not exactly. Rather, we hold that all is consciousness and its freedom, containing within it infinite possibilities from the beginning. These possibilities are always present, though not always perceptible to our senses much like the sun is ever present, yet its brilliance can prevent us from seeing it clearly. When the appropriate conditions arise, these possibilities become perceptible.
We therefore do not adopt either the Humean theory of causation or the NaiyÄyika model, since both face their own inconsistencies. Nor do we accept the SÄáčkhya SatkÄryavÄda theory in its strict form.
Objection: Then what causal principle do you advocate?
Response: I advocate a causal relation similar to that proposed in Kashmiri Ćaivism or in Berkeleyan idealism a relation between the subject and its signified object. This relation is one of continuous, ever-present manifestation, much like the constant radiance of sunlight. Such manifestation does not require sequential temporal verification, and thus avoids the difficulties associated with antecedent and subsequent events that are usually invoked to explain causality.
ContdâŠ.
