That saved me a post.
Commonly held beliefs are not necessarily objective facts, or even true.
We seem to be edging towards argumentum ad poplum.
It is an objective fact that billions of people believe the Jesus character in the bible was a deity, and could perform miracles. It is not an objective fact he possessed those attributes, as there is no objevtive evidence he was anything but human. If he existed at all, of course.
If the above-mentioned âframework-relative objective factsâ differ from what is observed in the real world (and is repeatably empirically demonstrated) or not observed/observable at all (making it pure speculation), that makes them neither objective nor facts. Rather, it would make them subjective. Whether they should be called beliefs, guesses, speculation, or whatever, depends on context. But theyâre not facts.
As a parallel, consider Kellyanne Conwayâs usage of the term âalternative factsâ about the inaccurate description of the crowds at Trumpâs first inaguration as âthe largest everâ. The statements are certainly alternative, and theyâre obviously not facts. Further, they would certainly not be âobjective factsâ even in the âframework-relativeâ context of the narrative of the Trump-cult.
I agree, and course since a fact is something known or proven to be true, it is in and of itself a high evidentiary bar, the fact (no pun intended) we can get these wrong both as individuals and as a collective merely demonstrates we are not infallible. An objective fact might be cited as a higher evidentiary standard again, and is true independently of any personal beliefs. A creationist may believe that it is a fact that a deity created humans in their current form a few thousand years ago, for example, but they are simply wrong, as the highest possible (currently) objective evidentiary standard demonstrates this simply isnât true, itâs not even epistemically possible, let alone objectively or nomologically. Without denying a mountain of objective facts verified to the highest possible standard we have.
As you say, to compare objective facts evidenced to the best available standard, to attributes assigned arbitrarily to imaginary things, would render the phrase meaningless. Even if those attributes exist in the real world.
Are you calling me âstupidâ?
Wouldnât dream of it, Ratty. Youâre not one of them. The only person I consider to be stupid would be notsid.
The magic idea was great. I waved my spiral tool, the portal opened and an hour later I was happily under the influence of a damn good Cab,Merlot, Grenache. Happy days
So which was it? Inquiring minds and all that.
It was a blendâŚCab Sav, Grenache and Merlot, not one I had tried before. A local wine from Margeret River. Boutique winery. I shall definitely be buying this one again.
As I have clarified, objective facts within a fictional-framework still count as objective facts. For example, Sherlock Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street, London, in the fictional world of Arthur Conan Doyle. Sherlock Holmes is fictional, and doesnât exist in the real world, but as a framework-relative objective fact, itâs correct.
You point out that unicorns have also been known to be goat-like. Thatâs not unusual for a label to represent distinct entities, both in fiction and in the real world.
Consider a âDragonâ as another fictional example. Western ideas of dragons are evil, fire-breathing, reptilian creatures, whereas Chinese dragons are water associated and wise, serpentine creatures.
And in the real world, a panther is a cougar or mountain lion in North America; a jaguar in South America; or a (black) leopard in Africa/Asia.
Therefore in the real-world, and in fiction, labels can have framework-relative objective facts - the framework can be a fictional entity/world, or it can be a specific instance in the real world, like the panther example.
No, that would be misleading. If someone was talking about a fictional world where homeopathic treatements worked, then framework-relative objective facts for that fictional world could include âlike cures likeâ and equivalent facts for that world. One could also hypothesise a world/species somewhere in the universe where homeopathy actually works, in which case the objective facts would bear out in the framework of that real-world instance.
Just because a unicorn is a mythological being as far as weâre concerned on Earth doesnât mean it canât have framework-relative objective facts, and if a unicorn were to exist somewhere in the universe, it too would have framework-relative objective facts.
A human explorer could encounter a new planet, point at a horse-like creature with a horn and say, âthatâs a unicorn!â, but an intelligent alien species of that same planet could just as easily point to a starfish-like creature and say, âin your language, we call this a unicornâ. The framework-relative objective facts would remain preserved for their respective frameworks. All that happens is that there are additional frameworks with their own framework-relative objective facts.
When I have referenced objective facts, this has been distinct from commonly held beliefs.
The distinguishing point is that objective facts are being established in a framework-relative context. The real-world is preserved as being facts specifically about the real-world, and fictional frameworks are not being conflated with the real-world.
When I have referenced unicorns, I have given two contexts:
I agree that objective facts about unicorns within these contexts do not by extension grant a unicorn any semblance of fact in the real world. It is still mythological or hypothetical respectively. The context preserves the distinction.
I wouldnât seek to claim such a thing as an objective fact outside the relevant frameworks. Such a claim as to real-world objective facts would require extraordinary evidence.
And that highlights the distinction. A discussion can occur where objective facts are referenced and the context establishes whether the objective facts relate to a real-world framework, or something else. If the context doesnât establish that, itâs not a fault of the term, âobjective factâ, itâs a failure to clarify the framework.
subjective (view) would be relative to the person considering something to be a certain way - which is valid in such a context (i.e., an opinion).
What has been discussed here though is not the view of facts/opinions according to a specific subject, it is the view of objective facts according to a specific framework.
For example, Sherlock Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street is an objective fact in the framework of Arthur Conan Doyleâs world created in his series of books. It is independently established - a fictional world has been created in which Sherlock Holmes lives at the stated address.
Consider, if one were to participate in a quiz about Sherlock Holmes, the questions asked would be of this nature. âWhat was Sherlock Holmesâ address?â, etc. - a quiz can only work if there are objective facts for which a question can be asked and an objective answer can be given; even if the subject of the quiz (Sherlock Holmes) is fictional.
What is happening in this instance is that objective reality is being disputed as though a desired outcome can be preferential to reality. They donât fit as âframework-relativeâ unless one considers the framework to be Trumpâs make believe world, but given they are asserted as alternative claims for reality, they fail this distinction, and are simply incorrect.
That is what I do, but often not what professional philosophers do and TBH I have lost interest in closely following this thread because I have never needed to formally think about X different kinds of possibility to get through everyday life. If you understand the difference between possibility and probability so that you can avoid taking up a lot of time and energy on improbabilities, then IMO nothing more is really needed. I am not sure what animates your desire (and Sheldonâs) to argue to this level of detail on the topic.
Not that thereâs a thing in the world wrong with doing so, Iâm just not that into it.
Indeed, and I was addressing the latter, in your assertion that ti was an objective fact unicorns were horse like creatures with a horn on their head. That this is a commonly held view is not disputed, but it isnât true. Those attributes are merely assigned to an imaginary thing.
As someone explained mythologies can and do change over time, and my only objection to the second was your claim it was objectively possible, one could assert it is epistemically possible, but even this could be challenged.
It was only an example to illustrate the difference between epistemic and objective possible.
Well it was your claim, and several posters explained why they were dubious that it was an objective fact, and remain dubious that unicorn like creatures are objectively possible, as the evidence does not support this being a real world possibility.
And as framework-relative objective facts, they are true within the framework indicated.
In terms of objectively possible being a metaphysical possibility as opposed to a nomological possibility, it is correct. The possibility is not logically contradictory based on the reasoning already given (a horse-like creature with a single horn on its head could possibly evolve on another planet, and a human explorer could discover the creature and call it a unicorn), so it meets the requirement for objective possibility (metaphysical possibility).
I also gave another example where an alien explorer could have transported a unicorn to earth in the past, and the initial references to unicorns which have later been considered mythological could have been a discovery of that transported creature. (I also believe there are some beliefs/theories that what was initially called a unicorn may have been a rhinoceros, so it is not conclusive that the idea of a unicorn initially came from an imagination, either way)
As above, I have given two examples of how it can be a real-world possibility, and I have separately explained how objective facts can be framework-relative.
I disagree for the reasons I and others have stated, simply repeating your claim doesnât add anything.
That we can imagine something, and arbitrarily assign it attributes we find in nature, does not mean that what we imagine is objectively possible. The claim looks like a false equivalence to me.
It is objectively possible for a horse like creature, with a horn to have evolved on another planet, is a different claim to it is objectively possible for a unicorn to exist on another planet. The argument relies on a false equivalence because it misrepresents what makes unicorns fictional. A unicorn is not simply the sum of its parts; it is a mythical creature by definition.
Epistemically possible, but a massive stretch to call this objectively possible, again this argument ignores the fact that the primary characteristic of unicorns is that they are mythical.
It doesnât matter, as we are dealing with a mythical concept now by definition, and the comparison apart from being purely speculative looks like another false equivalence for the same reason.
No, you made unevidenced assumptions that amounted to false equivalences, since any argument canât simply compare a mythical creature to extant species, when they differ fundamentally in a way that is crucial to whether they can be considered objectively possible. Lions exist, eagles exist, this does not mean Griffins are objectively possible. They differ in the very characteristic that defines objective possibility.
As for interstellar travellers, Iâd need something beyond the claim before Iâd accept this was objectively possible.
I didnât simply repeat my claim, I provided clarity that the objective facts were âframework-relativeâ.
It is logical to say that a framework is true. For example consider the following chain:
I have distinguished it as being objectively possible as a metaphysical possibility. The requirements for a metaphysical objective possibility are that the thing is logically coherent. This sets it apart from a nomological possibility where it must be proven physically possible.
For a claim of false equivalence, you would need to evidence that the thing is not logically coherent.
In order to support the claim that a unicorn is a mythical creature by definition, you would need to evidence that the original and/or objective definition of a unicorn is that it is necessarily mythical.
Your previous link to the Encyclopaedia Britannia regarding unicorns contradicts this position. Yes, it states the unicorn is mythical, and that is not being disputed here, but it doesnât present the âmythicalâ trait as necessary. To the contrary, it states that the earliest description in Greek literature was by a historian, and that:
âThe actual animal behind Ctesiasâs description was probably the Indian rhinoceros.â
The Indian rhinoceros is a real (non-mythological) creature, so the earliest description in Greek literature of a unicorn was referring to a real creature. It is only later that the description has shifted away from the intended target (rhinoceros) and has become something considered to be mythological.
Further, consider again our Sherlock Holmes.
We cannot say that âSherlock Holmesâ is necessarily fictional. We can say that the fictional character Sherlock Holmes is intrinsically fictional as they exist in the fictional world created by Conan Doyle in his literary works, but this does not preclude a real-world label matching the fictional label and matching the traits that applied to that fictional label existing.
Should it be said that the real world Sherlock Holmes is not Sherlock Holmes?
Youâre in danger of a paradox here. In order to recognise a difference between the two labels, you would need to acknowledge the objective fact of both. At present, youâre denying the objective fact of a fictional label even in a framework-relative state.
If Bob our intrepid explorer visits planet Bob, sees a horse-like creature with a horn on its head and says, âahh a new creature, I shall call it a unicornâ, then that creature becomes a unicorn.
I have already addressed the point of unicorns not being necessarily mythical, but just to add here that meanings can change. A unicorn at present is considered mythological, but if a new creature is found that looks exactly like a unicorn, and is called a unicorn by its discoverer, the âmythicalâ characteristic would no longer apply. Just the same as evidence being uncovered of an alien visitation bringing a unicorn to 400BC, etc. would do.
Interstellar travel is objectively possible.
Humans have built spacecraft that allow manned travel to the moon.
Humans have built spacecraft that have left the solar system.
Therefore we logically and physically have the capacity to build a manned spacecraft that could leave the solar system.
There are constraints - a manned spacecraft needs food, oxygen, water, power.
A large enough spacecraft could include hydroponics growing food under artificial light, plants generate oxygen, water can be recycled, power can be sourced from nuclear, solar, etc. The international space station shows a degree of what is possible.
Other constraints are size - getting the required mass into orbit, and cost. Neither are impossible.
A sufficiently large space craft could be generational - enough people to maintain genetic diversity (and this could be aided further with genetic material stored onboard allowing for diversity beyond the existing crew)
Interstellar travel is scientifically technically possible with existing technologies, even if it is not viable.
Youâre free to doubt the feasibility of interstellar travel, but asserting itâs not objectively possible would require evidence that it is physically impossible, which would contradict current scientific understanding.
Theyâre not, I offered an explanation of why, you used a false equivalence, that focused on characteristics because they can exist in the real world, while ignoring the primary characteristic of unicorns, that they are mythological, they are not real, by definition.
It is an objective fact those things are part of a fiction, it is not an objective fact they are real, and this is also a poor analogy, as detectives and addresses are not mythological, whereas unicorns are mythological, so to claim they are objectively possible is dubious, of course there is no universal agreement even among philosophers.
I find the claim dubious, for the reasons stated, that others are prepared to stretch the definition of objective reality in this way is up to them I guess. From the very start I stated that possibility couldnât simply be asserted but had to be demonstrated, and though we examined different types or philosophical descriptions of possibility, they all must be demonstrated, even epistemic possibility, has a distinct definition that must be demonstrated, and the phrase simply means âfor all we know X may be possibleâ. The lowest epistemological bar if you will.
noun
It is lierally defined this way in the OED, ipso facto it is is mythical by definitionâŚGoogle it if you donât believe me.
âŚand I said is, not was or always was, the etymological provenance might be open to debate, itâs definition isnât. Unicorns are mythological by definition is an accurate statement.
Itâs not even epistemically possible.
Which is in our solar system and thus not interstellar travel.
Did anyone travel in them?
No we absolutely do not. We canât get to most of the planets in our own solar system yet.
Not to mention either light speed travel, or humans who live exponentially longer than we currently do. Proxima Centauri is nearest, a red dwarf star approximately 4.24 light-years away. With current technology traveling to Proxima Centauri, would take around 6,300 years.
unicorns are currently considered mythological, but this is not a necessary characteristic. If you are claiming otherwise, you would have the burden of proof to evidence that this characteristic is more than just how they are currently viewed but a necessary characteristic that they are dependent on.
I never said it was real - the quote literally states it is fictional. That is the point of the argument. Objective facts can be relative to a specific framework, and a framework can be fiction.
Please explain the difference between mythological and fictional that has any bearing on the analogy.
Epistemic possibility: As long as the person considering something to be possible is not aware of any logical contradiction or physical limitation, they can correctly state something is epistemically possible
Objective (metaphysical) possibility: As long as the corpus of knowledge does not give any reason why something would be logically contradictory, they can correctly state something is objectively (metaphysically) possible
Nomological possibility: Something would need to be known to be physically possible, supportable by evidence that it would work within the laws of physics, and be logically coherent, to be called nomologically possible.
Only nomological possibility needs to be demonstrated. Epistemic and objective (metaphysical) possibilities stand on their own - if someone can evidence that something is not logically coherent, this would be a counter-point to an objective (metaphysical) possibility claim.
That simply means how it is currently viewed. It does not support it being a necessary characteristic. Your evidence is insufficient.
Iâm not disputing they are currently considered mythological, but that definition is subject to change. If someone saw a horse-like creature with a horn and called it a unicorn, then the definition would change/expand accordingly to accommodate this.
Epistemic possibility simply requires a person to not be aware of any limitations or logical contradictions. Weâve already been over this. Your claim is unsupportable.
What does that matter? Weâve had humans travel into space, and weâve had spacecraft exit the solar system. It is technologically possible for humans to exit the solar system.
We certainly can - the only things holding us back are the costs. Weâve travelled to the moon, we are capable of travelling to Mars. Itâs technologically feasible, especially if one ignores elements of safety and things like the return trip.
The following article considers the possibility of a worldship, and bear in mind, this is considering the feasibility not only of interstellar travel, but travel to a potential exoplanet that could be colonised, and all the necessary safety measures:
World ships: Feasibility and Rationale
It concludes that the current constraints are economic (costs) and resource demands, which mean a worldship wouldnât be feasible until the year 2300 (accounting for the scaling up of the economy, etc.) and that newer technologies could render it obsolete in the meantime.
This does however prove interstellar travel is objectively possible.
Thatâs where generation ships come in as above. But weâre already developing laser sail technologies that would increase speeds.