I’m not sure if this is relevant to your points, but your issues with language seem to apply to the “ontological argument” for God’s existence.
The ontological argument (and I am over-simplifying) seems to be as follows: "We can imagine a perfect being, which we may define as God. Since non-existence would be a flaw in perfection . . . well . . . God must exist.
"Therefore, the phrase ‘God does not exist’ is self-contradictory, or an oxymoron.
“This means that God must exist.”
My own way of contradicting this bit of wordplay is that I can imagine an ideal gas, a perfect mathematical point, a temperature of absolute zero, or a perfect black body . . . and just because I can imagine such things does not imply existence.
So, your points are interesting if we can get in a discussion about how different languages may define the ontological argument . . . and how this exploration may show subtle differences in peoples’ cultural and linguistic influences in religious thought.