I agree. It must be an AI account. 
a quick way to spot AI output: most of them way over use the em dash and en dash. Humans rarely use them and can’t type them directly.
I went over my keyboard layout, and found out that it is very easy (at least on this Linux computer). The hyphen (-) is trivial. The en dash (–) is AltGr -, while the em dash (—) is Shift AltGr -. Easy peasy 
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In the last blurb, I put forth the idea that new knowledge is sometimes caused in us by way of argumentation from a knowledge preexisting in us.
This seems to be true in all disciplines, and both of deductive arguments which take their start from more commonly accepted premises, and of inductive arguments, which take their start from a sufficient enumeration of singulars —typically grasped by sense observation.
What kind of prior knowledge is required? There are two types of prior knowledge: that something is, and what something is.
In an argument generally, some consequent follows from an antecedent. The antecedent is composed of judgements — at least two — of which we have to know that they are (true). When these are sufficiently common and fundamental, they might be called principles, whether they be axioms, definitions, or hypotheses. More on these principles later if there is interest.
In the consequent, or conclusion, some property is attributed to some subject. Of the property, we need only know what it is — at least in the sense of being able to give some kind of nominal definition — and of the subject we must know both what it is and that it is.
Aristotle likes the example of the proof that triangle (the subject) has “three angles equal to two rights” (the property), using as a principle, for example, the equality of alternate interior angles.
To illustrate his claims about logic and science, Aristotle prefers to give mathematical examples, because they are more manifest, easier to understand, and easier to come by. But sometimes, especially for modern readers who tend to more sharply divide the “empirical” from the “mathematical” sciences than the Greeks did, these examples may not be sufficiently plausible in their secondary role of imperfect induction.
To find such “empirical” examples that seem more plausible to us, we can try to apply these notions to fields we may be familiar with. It may also be helpful to look at the works of scientists of the early modern period, who were often trained in late (and by then largely decadent) scholasticism - and hence often had a pretty good knowledge of Aristotle. Galileo is a good example; he makes extensive use of Aristotle’s logic in his works.
I said that we “moderns” tend to more sharply divide the “empirical” from the “mathematical” sciences than the Greeks did. More than anything else this probably arises from how different our conception of mathematics is.
I disagree.
Another category would be the context and/or relationship with something else.
If I have a wad of American money in New York City, then this cash has a different meaning than if I have the same wad of cash in Antarctica, or in the middle of Papua New Guinea.
Since the purpose of cash is to signify value, is it wrong to say that a wad of cash in New York City is a different object than the same wad of cash in the middle of Antarctica?
Likewise a masked man on a ski slope is different than the same masked man in a bank.
And so on.
So knowledge of an object depends upon its context.
Or maybe I misunderstand you.
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To the extent that context modifies “meaning” or makes something into “a different object” and is not merely circumstantial, it enters into what something is.
What is a masked man in a bank? A robber. On a ski slope? A doctor on holiday.
Thank you for the engaging comment. I love the examples.
Now I would say, from a skeptic point of view, that “pre-existing knowledge” would be presumptive knowledge.
Something we consider knowledge but we have no means to independently validate it as such.
All subsequent knowledge would be dependent on those same presumptions.
But that would be taking skepticism to its extreme 
Both require empirical observations.
If you want to apply them to the real world, your axioms/definitions/hypotheses depend upon empirical observations for correctness.
The proof depends on the empirical observation that cartesian geometry is, for everyday uses, correct. If space[1] wasn’t Cartesian, the Pythagorean theorem, for example, would just be abstract and irrelevant deductions done by crazy philosophers of the societal elite. Instead, they would have derived other forms of the same principle, although they would be more complex. In short, empirical observations about the properties of space are the foundation of triangle properties.
Whatever. You can do a lot of fantastic mathematics and logic without ever squinting towards empirical measurements — think number theory, group theory, graph theory, foundational set theory (although they also require some empirical kickstarting, like observing objects and understanding the need to count them). However, if you want your deductions, derivations or calculations to say something about anything in the physical world, you depend upon empirical observations. You can theorise, deduce, and calculate all you like with Aristotelian physics, but it is wrong as applied to the real world. It is irreconcilable with the real world, as it has not had its axioms, assumptions, and conclusions correctly calibrated with observations of the real world. At least not to a sufficient degree. So the idea that you can deduce anything from preexisting knowledge AND be correct about it the first time around when it comes to the real world is at best naïve. At some point you DEPEND upon empirical observations. And if your assumptions, deductions, or conclusions disagree with observation, it is most likely not the observations[2] that are wrong. Shit in, shit out. Data is king.
Back then mathematics was a “gentleman’s endeavour” that regular people did not need to care too much about. Today it is another matter. We require all children to learn basic mathematics, and it is more or less a requirement for leading a modern life, setting up household budgets, managing loans, scaling recipes, etc. We view mathematics differently because today it is important for the regular guy in the street.
And for good measure, I repeat: Shit in, shit out. Data is king.
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To be adequate for demonstration, this prior knowledge will need to be true - and somehow known to be true. This might be by a prior demonstration, but that cannot go on forever without leading to an infinite regress. Otherwise nothing would be known absolutely in this way, but only conditionally, as in if p then q.
Ultimately, premises will have to be true, immediate, more known than, prior to, and causes of the conclusion. For a future blurb.
Yes they generally do, and in different ways.
None of what I am saying ignores the need for experimentation to, for example, hunt down a good definition, or to correctly identify which entities exist, which properties they in fact have, to test plausible causes and explanations, etc. Just because I am now attending to demonstrations, doesn’t mean I am imagining that science is mainly done from an armchair.
What is being drawn here is better described as a picture of perfected science, an ideal, an achievement. What science looks like when you finally have it. Most of the science that we actually do doesn’t reach that ideal, but only tends to it, more or less.
Yes and no. “Data is king” is not something I would agree to unqualifiedly. The scientific community these days suffers from what a friend of mine aptly calls “data worship”, which manifests in various ways – but generally takes the form of ‘data’ collection that amounts to little more than tallying instrument indications and falls short of genuine measurement.
In the psychosocial sciences, this takes the form of collecting data about constructs that have been operationalized, but about which little to no effort has been made to see if they correspond to real entities – sometimes because this is thought to be methodologically impossible. In biomedical sciences, this might take the form of long papers detailing intricate methodologies and their results, but with little or no conclusions made about a biomedically significant measurand. I have wasted too many days of my life reading such papers. They barely rises to the level of intelligent observations.
One might call this sort of work “data masturbation”: it’s playing with the (expensive!) tools of science, but without ever doing any real science.
One can have respect for good data and measurement without worshipping or getting off on it. That some people do that does not mean we can draw conclusions in the absence of data. Perhaps we can hypothesize, and perhaps those hypotheses can even be falsifiable.
I am not sure what you are really getting at here: are you saying that some things can be “known” in some je ne sais quoi sense apart from empirical observation, experimentation, and the like? Because one intuits it or it feels “truthy”? If yes then what, if any, guardrails are on this “knowing” to distinguish it in some meaningful way from random flights of fancy?
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In my experience: when people start prefacing words with the adjective “real”; it means the bullshit is getting deep.
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That’s the problem though. All knowledge has to begin with a presumption, skeptically speaking.
If one considers the very first knowledge we gain, it is dependent on the presumption that our senses are correct and our interpretation of them is valid.
The presumption is reasoned with its consistency, but that doesn’t escape it being a presumption.
In terms of absolute certainty, yes, practically nothing can be known absolutely, other than there being existence generally in some form or another, and a “thinker of thoughts”
The relationship between the world, how the world gives itself to us (etymologically data means ‘the given’), and our knowledge of the world is complex. The schematic “data implies data supported conclusions” is likely an oversimplification, and not be the best general account of how we know the world… Good measurements, for example, especially those that are likely to advance our knowledge of the world, could be considered “data”, but they require very careful prior theorizing and conceptualization.
Intuition, or more technically intellect, what the Greeks called nous, is required to grasp first principles. These cannot be demonstrated, but they can be defended by resolving objections to them, and usually can be supported by appeals to experience.
But, no, things are not well judged to be true based on some feeling of certainty…
Dialectic debates, which do largely draw from our experience, do this, albeit imperfectly. At bottom, a well functioning intellect is something natural, and there is only so much that instruments (logic) can do to supply for its weakness. This is especially true when it comes to grasping basic principles.
As I read it, “presumption” connotes the idea that something is posited as true by some sort of choice, as a quasi-arbitrary unproven starting point. I would say instead that the very first starting points of our knowing are the things we know naturally - and hence with certainty.
Sense cognition of so called proper sensibles is an example. We don’t begin by assuming our senses are reliable. We just naturally begin by knowing the world through our senses. There’s a big difference.
I don’t know that this means. What do you mean by “reasoned with its consistency” ?
This presupposes that all knowledge comes from the senses?
Here absolutely is only opposed to conditionally, and does not refer to the degree of certainty.
As a relative newcomer to this forum and a complete newcomer to this thread, is it permitted for me to ask The Metrologist what kind of theist he is?
If this is considered off-topic or if this kind of question is not permitted, please forgive my ignorance of these matters.
Why do I ask it? When I was a member of the now defunct debate forum of this site…
…I found that it was helpful to know the context in which a theist was making their arguments.
Even ones that weren’t specifically related to their theistic beliefs.
Thank you,
Walter.
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It is completely permissible.
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I think presumptions that we are attracted to seem at least internally consistent and usually at least “not inconsistent” with, or maybe at least rationalizable with respect to, known facts.
I can never read a statement like this, though, without recalling a client I once had who, when I pointed out that the data sets they were generating reports from were, themselves, inaccurate and skewed, said, “The data is the data. It has its own consistency”.
That was almost 30 years ago and I still shake my head in wonderment at that willfully stupid remark.
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Thank you for your guidance, CyberLN.
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I would like to contribute to this thread by focusing on Sheldon’s response to The Metrologist. Specifically what he says about an appeal to authority.
“All teaching and all learning through discourse proceed from previous knowledge.” - Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, start.
I’m a member of this forum. https://www.physicsforums.com/
Since joining I’ve learned and been taught many things. This has happened through discourse and knowledge has been imparted to me by the scientists running the forum and other scientists who are members of it. But does that mean that in receiving this knowledge the fallacy of an appeal to authority has been at work?
For example, if I were to ask them a question about the oscillation of neutrinos between their three different flavours and then received their answer, have I committed the fallacy by just accepting what I’ve been told? I can’t verify the answer for myself by going out and building my own neutrino detector. I don’t have the smarts, the technical knowhow or the funding to do that.
Yes, I can cross-reference what I’ve been told by seeking out other sources of information and confirming it that way. But by doing that aren’t I just comparing what one authority says with what another authority says? So I’m not actually correcting the fallacy or even side-stepping it. I’m still caught in the position of HAVING to accept what a given authority tells me about something I cannot check, test or verify for myself, by myself.
I’d even go so far as to submit that a great deal of science and learning and knowledge is like this. Nobody outside the scientific community can find out for themselves and by themselves much of what they are told. They have little choice but to accept it or to reject, because testing it is usually impossible.
So I suppose my questions for Sheldon are these.
What choice do ordinary Joe’s have but to accept what authority tells them about things that are beyond investigation? And is the doing of this fallacious? Are there any alternatives?
Thank you,
Walter.