And I have pointed to and provided you with modal and deductive proofs time and time again. And yet, either due to ignorance, incapacity, or obstinance, you refuse to engage with them.
Ok. So which of the axioms do you disagree with?
Yes, but I cannot assume my belief in deities to be rational unless tied to a modal proof which would justify the provisional position that I hold if I did all my empirical homework correctly in respect to the deity that I believe in. In like manner, you cannot assume your disbelief in deities to be rational unless tied to a modal proof which would justify the provisional position that you hold if you did your empirical homework correctly.
Yes. But thatâs not whatâs happening here. You wouldnât buy a car or board a plane that was missing an essential structural component or trust a professed medical doctor who didnât have the essential education and license necessary to qualify him if you had good sense. Likewise, you shouldnât believe a provisional claim about an essential contingency if such claim cannot be tied to a modal proof that is logically consistent and mathematically sound.
No. If provisional claim about an essential contingency can be tied to a modal proof that is logically consistent and mathematically sound, we have an ontological and epistemological duty to accept it as rational agents. To do otherwise is to be irrational.
If tied to an essential contingency can be tied to a modal proof that is logically consistent and mathematically sound, you must in order to claim that you are rational concerning the subject.
Perhaps you misunderstand. Your statement confuses freedom with epistemic permissibility. Psychologically, a person can believe whatever they want: the mind can form unjustified beliefs. But epistemologically, freedom isnât the issue; justification is. What one is free to believe says nothing about what one ought to believe. This is similar to: âYouâre free to guess any answer on an exam.â
No, not entirely. At the object-level, not all standards are viable. Once you choose an epistemic standard, your ability to track truth constrains what counts as a âreasonableâ standard. This is where subjectivity dissolves.
Months? Where in the world did you get that?
No. Iâm seriously asking you to define exactly what youâre objecting to as an atheist. (1) What do you think God is? (2) Why do you object the existence of God relative to the definition you provided?